Preventing abuse of online communities by Irani, Danesh







of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
August 2012
PREVENTING ABUSE OF ONLINE COMMUNITIES
Approved by:
Professor and John P. Imlay Jr. Chair in
Software, Dr. Calton Pu, Advisor
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
Associate Professor, Dr. Kang Li
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor, Dr. Mustaque Ahamad
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
Assistant Professor, Dr. Jonathon Gi!n
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor, Dr. Ling Liu
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: May 8th, 2012
To my family and all those who have supported me through this journey.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“It takes a village to raise a child” is certainly true in the journey to obtain a Ph.D. My
journey has been a transformation not only in terms of being able to conduct and publish
research, but also in terms of personal growth. I am truly grateful and sincerely thankful
to everyone who has been there through the peaks and valleys of this journey.
First and foremost I want to thank my advisor, Prof. Calton Pu. His constant guidance,
inspiration, and encouragement have been one of the driving reasons for my transformation
during the Ph.D. He pushed me to exceed my own boundaries and excel in all aspects of
what I did, without taking any shortcuts. I cannot understate my appreciation towards the
freedom he gave me to pursue my interests within the area of security and privacy, as well
as for his patience during my exploration of the area. I admit that initially I did not truly
understand the value of his meta-comments but I have realized that over-time they have
been invaluable to making me a better and more capable researcher.
I would also like to thank members of my dissertation committee – Prof. Mustaque
Ahamad, Prof. Jonathon Gi!n, Prof. Ling Liu, and Prof. Kang Li – for reading and com-
menting on my dissertation. My proposal and defense were two of the most grueling and
fun presentations I have done, and I appreciate all the questions and challenges that led to
an improved dissertation.
To Prof. Jonathon Gi!n and Prof. Kang Li, co-authoring papers with you was a pleasure
and I appreciate all the careful critiques of my work and the advice given to me both in
relation to research and life. I am also thankful to my other co-authors including Prof.
Davide Balzarotti, Prof. Engin Kirda, and Prof. Lakshmi Ramaswamy whom I have all
learned a great deal from. I would like to especially thank Prof. Engin Kirda and Prof.
Davide Balzarotti for believing in me and advising me during my time as a visiting researcher
at Eurecom, and after.
To all my internship mentors including Darren Shou, Sanjay Sawhney, Dr. Susanta
iv
Nanda, Diego Gilscarbo, Brian Williams, Dr. Nitya Narasimhan, and Tzvetan Horozov, I
thank you for all your guidance and everything I have learned from you. It was amazing
having such great people to work with and I appreciate it dearly.
To Mehenaz Soonawalla, Christina Lee, and Monika Chhabria, more a"ectionately
known as the council of wise women. You have supported me all along and have been
there to hear about the good times and the bad, in as much or as little detail as I wanted
to give. You have always known the right thing to say or sometimes just to listen. For all
this and more, my sincerest thanks.
To Dr. Steve Webb, your drive and dedication inspire me; and I will not forget your
guidance and patience with a junior Ph.D. student entering the area of security and privacy.
I thank you for the early direction in research and for all the games of disc golf. To Dr.
Qinyi Wu – a caring labmate who constantly reminded me to take better care of myself and
did not fail to ask me the hard questions others may have sidestepped –, to Dr. Bhuvan
Bamba – for answering questions tirelessly and making great food –, and to Dr. Vishakha
Gupta-Cledat – who spent many hours studying together for the System qualifier exam –
thank you.
To friends who have peppered the journey to my dissertation with cherished memo-
ries, including Ahamad Al-Yamani, Vijay Balasubramiam, Leyla Bilge, Martim Carbone,
Rachita Chum, Romain Cledat, Nevena Djaja, Ioannis Doudalis, Kyle Gochenour, Vishaka
Gupta, Binh Han, Andrea Lanzi, Athena Lee, Sarah Iqbal, Yani Ioannou, Sarishta Katrak,
Vahishta Katrak, Mukil Kesavan, Tushar Kumar, Zohre Kurt, Sarah Naqvi, Devi Sampat,
Mona Shah-Joshi, Kapil Singh, Nadia Szeinbaum, Bianca Su, Priyanka Tembey, De Wang,
Qingyang Wang, and Andrea Zohner my sincerest thank you!! To any labmates and friends
at Georgia Tech, the hours in the lab would have gone by a lot slower without your company
and I would have enjoyed it a lot less – thank you. To my labmates and friends at Eurecom,
my time in Sophia Antipolis was undoubtedly one of the best summers of my life – thank
you. To friends in Toronto, coming home in winter would not be as warming without you.
Last, but not least, to my family – words cannot express my gratitude for always being
there and encouraging me along the way. I am all I am because of you and I love you all
v
dearly. To my father, Sharukh Irani, I hope to someday be as good a father as you. To
my brother, Shahvir Irani, thanks for being the best brother anyone could ask for. To my
mother, even though you are not here, this is for you.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Dissertation Statement and Dissertation Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II PRELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Supervised learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1 Standard Supervised Learning Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2 Implementation of Supervised Learning Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.3 Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Standard Unsupervised Learning Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Dimensionality Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Information Gain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2 !2 Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
PART I PROTECTION AGAINST DENIAL OF INFORMATION (DOI) ATTACKS
III EVOLUTION OF PHISHING ATTACKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.1 Comparison to spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.2 Anatomy of a phishing message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Message Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1 Phishing dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.2 Identifying phishing messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 Phishing Content Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.1 Duplication of phishing content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vii
3.3.2 Lifetime of phishing content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 Phishing Features Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.1 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.2 Characterizing features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
IV DETECTION OF SOCIAL SPAM PROFILES USING STATIC CON-
TENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1 Social Spam Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.1 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.2 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.3 Feature extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3 Feature Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.1 Categorical features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.2 Free-form text features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.4 Analysis of Classification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4.1 Categorical features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4.2 Free-form text features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.4.3 Categorical and Free-form text features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.5 Analysis of Adversarial Classification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.5.1 Categorical features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.5.2 Free-form text features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
V DETECTION OF TREND-STUFFING ON TWITTER . . . . . . . . 55
5.1 Overview of Tweets and Trending Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1.1 Trend Stu!ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Tweet Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
viii
5.2.1 Dataset collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.3 Reduction of Feature Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4 Experimental Classification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.4.1 Classification using Tweet Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.4.2 Classification using Webpage Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4.3 Classification using Tweet Text and Webpage Content combined . 67
5.4.4 Manual Verification of a Subset of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
PART II PROTECTING AGAINST INFORMATION LEAKAGE ATTACKS
VI USER’S SOCIAL FOOTPRINTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1.1 Online Social Footprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1.2 Threats of Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.2 Online Identities and Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.3 Size of a user’s online social footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.4 Reconstructing a person’s online social footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.4.1 Prior knowledge of pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.4.2 Inferring a pseudonym from a name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.4.3 Matching profile information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
VII MODELING INFORMATION LEAKAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.1 Attacks using Unintended Personal Information Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.2 Online Social Footprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.1 Blurring the Boundaries between Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.2 Definition of Social Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.3 Quantitative Definitions of Aggregate Attribute Leakage . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.3.1 Definition of Attribute Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
ix
7.3.2 Definition of Aggregate Attribute Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.4 Online Identities and Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.5 Experimental Evaluation and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.5.1 Attribute Leakage Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.5.2 Aggregate Attribute Leakage Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.6 Applying Cloaking to Counter Information Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.6.1 Cloaking Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.6.2 Attribute Leakage with Cloaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.6.3 Experimental Evaluation of Cloaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
VIII REVERSE SOCIAL-ENGINEERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8.1 Reverse Social Engineering in Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.1.1 Recommendation-Based RSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.1.2 Demographic-Based RSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.1.3 Visitor Tracking-Based RSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.2 RSE Attacks in the Real-World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
8.2.1 Ethical and Legal Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
8.2.2 Influencing Friend Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8.2.3 Measuring RSE E"ects by Creating Attack Profiles . . . . . . . . . 124
8.2.4 Automating the Measurement Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
8.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8.3.1 Recommendation-based RSE Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8.3.2 Demographic-based Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.3.3 Visitor Tracking Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
8.4 Discussion and Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
8.5 RSE Countermeasures in OSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
8.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
IX CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
x
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
xi
LIST OF TABLES
1 List of classifiers used with categorical features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Five largest clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 List of selected features with brief descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5 Features broadly split into four groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Transitory features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7 Pervasive features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8 Subset of fields parsed from a MySpace profile and a brief description of
non-obvious fields. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9 Results of classification based on the di"erent feature sets. . . . . . . . . . . 48
10 Results of classification under assumption of an adversary. Features with
high discriminatory power and low robustness are removed. . . . . . . . . . 48
11 Comparison of the number of features considered, when using Information
Gain to reduce the feature set size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12 Average time in ms, to train and test the classifiers over the tweet text. . . 66
13 Average time in ms, to train and test the classifiers over the webpage content. 68
14 Number of profile links. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
15 Subset of fields collected for each social networking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
16 RSE attacks on three popular social networks. ! indicates that the attack
is possible; " indicates that we demonstrate and measure the e"ectiveness
of this attack on the particular social network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
17 Characteristics of the dummy profiles used in the experiments . . . . . . . . 124
18 Overview of OSNs as well as number of users targeted. . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Example of a raw PayPal phishing message (see Figure 2 for rendered version) 18
2 Example of a rendered PayPal phishing message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Distribution of phishing messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 Distribution of Cluster Sizes (Note the Log-Log Scale) . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Phishing message duplication by month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6 Clusters from Top 15 exhibiting “Flash attack” behavior . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7 Phishing clusters from Top 15 exhibiting “Non-flash attack” behavior . . . 29
8 Illustration of transitory features in di"erent groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9 Illustration of pervasive features in di"erent groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10 Example of a social spam profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11 Discriminatory power of features measured by the !2 test for both categorical
features and free-form text features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
12 Percentage of suspended tweets vs number of tweets in a trend . . . . . . . 61
13 Results of classification on tweet text using di"erent number of features.
Error-bars represent one standard-deviation of the F1-measure. . . . . . . . 65
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SUMMARY
Online communities are growing at a phenomenal rate and with the large number
of users these communities contain, attackers are drawn to exploit these users. Denial of
information (DoI) attacks and information leakage attacks are two popular attacks that
target users on online communities. These information based attacks are linked by their
opposing views on low-quality information. On the one hand denial of information attacks
which primarily use low-quality information (such as spam and phishing) are a nuisance
for information consumers. On the other hand information leakage attacks, which use
inadvertently leaked information, are less e"ective when low-quality information is used,
and thus leakage of low-quality information is preferred by private information producers.
In this dissertation, I introduce techniques for preventing abuse against these attacks in
online communities using meta-model classification and information unification approaches,
respectively. The meta-model classification approach involves classifying the “connected
payload” associated with the information and using the classification result for the determi-
nation. This approach allows for detection of DoI attacks in emerging domains where the
amount of information may be constrained. My information unification approach allows for
modeling and mitigating information leakage attacks. Unifying information across domains
followed by a quantification of the information leaked, provides one of the first studies on
users’ susceptibility to information leakage attacks. Further, the modeling introduced allows





With the growth of the Internet and increase in the time spent online, online communities
are growing at a phenomenal rate. These online communities often exist via information
systems which range from early online communities such as bulletin board systems (BBS)
and email systems to modern online communities such as social networks. Members of
the online community usually share common interests or know each other in real life, and
participate in the online community by exchanging information from messages to pictures
and music.
Some of the most popular online communities are social networks, with large social
networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace attracting millions of visitors [40]. These
online communities allow users to communicate with friends and strangers alike, usually first
requiring the creation of an online profile. A user, using his/her online profile, can easily
share information such as personal pictures, life events, thoughts, and music to other online
profiles (users).
A large number and variety of online communities have emerged primarily due to each
online community catering to a facet of a user’s life [34]. For example, Facebook for personal
networking, Flickr for picture sharing, LinkedIn for professional networking, and Twitter for
keeping updated with events. This mirrors real-life where a person may behave di"erently
with di"erent sets of people and even have di"erent sets of friends for some areas of his/her
life. For example, a person is a musician to one set of individuals and a teacher to another set
of individuals. Similarly in online communities, users sign-up for multiple online profiles [65]
and share di"erent facets of their lives with di"erent sets of users.
With the large number of users and information contained within these online commu-
nities, attackers are attracted to try and abuse them. Although there are many di"erent
ways to abuse social networks, the two we focus on are diametrically opposing views of
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low-quality information. On the one hand, from an information consumer’s standpoint,
low-quality information is undesired as it detracts from consumption of useful information
in the online community. In extreme cases, namely denial of information (DoI) attacks this
can make communities unusable, especially in cases of floods of spam, phishing, or fake
information. On the other hand, from a private information producer’s standpoint, if his
information is leaked to attackers, their obtaining low-quality information is desired as it
reduces the e"ectiveness of potential attacks. Users are currently unaware of the dangers
of unintended information leakage, which can be used in attacks such as compromising
accounts (via answering password recovery questions), stalking, and personal identification.
In this dissertation, we introduce techniques for protecting against denial of information
attacks and information leakage attacks in online communities using meta-model classifi-
cation and information unification approaches, respectively. Our meta-model classification
approach involves using the “connected payload” associated with information in determin-
ing the label for the information begin classified. This approach allows for early-detection
of DoI attacks in emerging domains where the amount of information may be constrained.
As an example, a DoI attack using tweets on Twitter is di!cult to detect using traditional
machine learning techniques due to limited information available within 140 characters.
We use the tweet content and fetched webpage meta-models to detect such attacks. We
look at static profile content classification in an e"ort to build a meta-model classifier for
social profiles. We explore the limits of static profile content classification as a stand-alone
technique for early detection of social spam. We apply insights gained from analysis of the
evolution of low-quality information to measure the resilience of our proposed approaches to
adaptations by attackers. Evolution and adaption to new techniques is a result of the high-
stakes involved in spreading low-quality information and is akin to an arms-race between
spammers and spam-researchers.
Our information unification approach combines information across domains to measure
personal information leakage and susceptibility to information leakage attacks. As a first
step in doing so, we introduce a method using pseudonyms to build a user’s social footprint,
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or a combined footprint of a user’s online presence. As an example, we measure the e"ec-
tiveness of knowing one pseudonym is in guessing pseudonyms used on other communities
and the e"ectiveness in guessing pseudonyms using a user’s name. Using social footprints,
we then introduce four measures to quantify the amount of information revealed and sus-
ceptibility of users to information leakage attacks. Having four di"erent measures allows
fine-grained determination the amount of information leaked including consistency. We use
information cloaking as a measure to reduce the amount of inadvertent public information
leakage.
1.1 Dissertation Statement and Dissertation Contributions
Before proceeding to the concrete contributions of this dissertation, the dissertation state-
ment can be formulated as follows:
Meta-model classification and information unification techniques can be used to
more e"ectively address significant challenges in preventing abuse of online com-
munities.
To support the dissertation statement, we make the following concrete contributions
divided into two parts based on the viewpoints of low-quality information.
Part I: Protection against denial of information (DoI) attacks – Low-quality infor-
mation from an information consumer’s standpoint
• Our first contribution is an analysis of the evolution of low-quality information which
occurs as a result of an arms-race between spammers and spam-researchers. Specifi-
cally, we investigate characteristics and features of phishing messages – a particularly
nefarious type of low-quality information disguised as important legitimate informa-
tion. One of the key outcomes is identifying transitory and pervasive features asso-
ciated with flash and non-flash attacks. We find that transitory features are usually
strong indicators of phishing which is likely the reason that the features appear only
for a short duration. We apply these insights in our subsequent research to develop
resilient long-term classification methods.
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• Our second contribution explores the e"ectiveness and long-term suitability of profile
classification using only static content. Static content is available on profile creation
– the entry point to sending spam on a social network – and thus we propose classifi-
cation on this content to identify and preclude spam profiles before spammers can use
them to propagate spam in the online community. Using insight from our previous
contribution, we evaluated features along the discriminatory power and robustness
dimensions, identifying features most likely to be transitory. We then measured clas-
sification performance with all the features as well as after removal of in transitory
features. We found that our classifiers performed well in both instances, but classi-
fication using text-features was more robust to removal of transitory features than
classification using categorical features.
• Our third contribution investigates identification of low-quality messages sent in on-
line communities where content rich profiles are not available. With message lengths
limited to a few hundred characters in some online communities, traditional machine-
learning techniques which are used on content rich messages will be ine"ective (e.g.
blog posts or personal messages). Although our previous contribution would be e"ec-
tive given static profile content, in the case of Twitter the message content is limited
to 140 characters as is the profile content to 160 characters. We introduce a meta-
model classification technique which combines classification of the short tweet-text
along with additional fetched content (such as linked web pages) to improve our ac-
curacy. We find that fetching associated content improves our classifiers F1-measure
by over 13.7%.
Part II: Protecting against information leakage attacks – Low-quality information
from a private information producer’s standpoint
Our approach involves unifying profiles across social networks to measure the amount
of information leaked and susceptibility towards information leakage attacks. After in-
troducing information cloaking, we quantify the reduction in users’ susceptibility towards
information leakage attacks.
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• Our fourth contribution proposes a technique to unifying a person’s profile (i.e., find-
ing social profiles associated with a single user) across online communities utilizing
pseudonyms. We find that over 40% of a person’s online identity can be reconstructed
by using a single pseudonym, and by using the person’s name the attacker can recon-
struct 10% to 35% of a person’s online identity.
• Our fifth contribution introduces models to measure the amount of public informa-
tion released across unified user’s profiles. We find, based on over 8,200 user’s online
identities, that the number of users susceptible to two real-world attacks increases
approximately nine times when looking at users’ unified social profile in comparison
to users’ individual social profile. We propose four measures to quantify information
revealed by a user’s unified social profile. The first measure quantifies the amount of
information revealed by the unified social profile; the second, quantifies the amount
of information revealed and consistent in a unified social profile using Entropy from
Information Theory; the third, quantifies the amount of information revealed and
consistent in a unified social profile using Guessing Entropy; and the last, quantifies
the amount of consistent information revealed in a unified social profile. We use these
measures to build a framework for detecting the susceptibility of a user towards an
information attack, such as a personal identification attack or a password recovery
attack. Using the same dataset of 8,200 user’s online identities, we find that the num-
ber of users susceptible to attacks increases approximately nine times when looking
at a user’s combined social footprint. We then use information cloaking to reduce the
usefulness of information publicly released by reducing its granularity. For example,
instead of publicly releasing an age of 25, a social network might indicate that the
user is between the ages of 20-25.
• Our final contribution is demonstrate social engineering attacks against online com-
munities. We show that although most people hide information by making details of
their profile private, we can use reverse social engineering to engage users. That is,
we discuss and show how attackers in practice can abuse some of the friend-finding
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features that online social networks provide with the aim of making users contact
them. Our results demonstrate that reverse social engineering attacks are feasible
and e"ective in practice.
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
We split each step of each contribution into a separate chapter, with chapters separated
by parts, to emphasize the di"erent viewpoints of low-quality information being tackled.
We attempt to keep each chapter an independent unit with its own evaluation and related
work. Common techniques and algorithms used across chapters are summarized in the
chapter “Preliminaries”. The remained of the dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter II: Preliminaries – We review common techniques used in this disser-
tation. machine learning techniques used in this dissertation. In addition, we some
attribute selection methods.
Part I: Protection against denial of information (DoI) attacks
Low-quality information from an information consumer’s standpoint
• Chapter III: Evolution of Phishing – To begin to understand the adversarial evo-
lution of low-quality information, we study the evolution of phishing email messages
using a corpus consisting of over a year of phishing messages. We identify phishing
campaigns within this corpora and characterize phishing campaigns as flash-attacks
or non-flash attacks. In addition we identify transitory features and pervasive features
present in these attacks. We find features which are present in a few attacks and have
a relatively short life span (transitory) are generally strong indicators of phishing,
whereas features which are present in most of the attacks and have a long life span
(pervasive) are generally weak selectors of phishing.
• Chapter IV: Detection of Social Spam Profiles using Static Content – We
make a case for analysis of static user profile content, possibly as soon as such profiles
are created, through an experimental study of over 1.9 million MySpace profiles. We
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compare several machine learning algorithms in their ability to distinguish spam pro-
files from legitimate profiles. We found that a C4.5 decision tree algorithm achieves the
highest accuracy (99.4%) of finding rogue profiles, while näıve Bayes achieves a lower
accuracy (92.6%). Having studied adversarial behavior, we also conducted a sensitiv-
ity analysis of the algorithms w.r.t. features which may be easily adapted/removed by
spammers.
• Chapter V: Detection of Trend-stu!ng on Twitter – In cases where a lot
of static user profile content is not available and only a small amount of message
text is available, we introduce meta-model classification to improve accuracy. We
study the use of text-classification over 600 trends consisting of 1.3 million tweets
and their associated webpages to identify tweets closely-related to a trend and in
doing so finding unrelated tweets. We compare the use of näıve Bayes, C4.5 decision
trees, and Decision Stumps, over the individual sets of features, followed by combining
predictions of classifiers over the tweet text and associated web-page text. In addition,
we look at the resilience of these classifiers to adversarial behavior by emulating an
adversary and rerunning our experiments.
Part II: Protecting against information leakage attacks
Low-quality information from a private information producer’s standpoint
• Chapter VI: User’s Social Footprints – We study large online social footprints by
collecting data on 13,990 active users. We investigate the ease by which an attacker
can reconstruct a person’s social network profile. Namely, we find that over 40%
of an individual’s social footprint can be reconstructed by using a single pseudonym
(assuming the attacker guesses the most popular pseudonym), and an attacker can
reconstruct 10% to 35% of an individual’s social footprint by using the person’s name.
We also perform an initial investigation of matching profiles using public information
in a person’s profile.
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• Chapter VII: Modeling Information Leakage – We model a user’s social foot-
print and introduce four measures to quantify the amount of information revealed in
respect to information leakage attacks (such as, answering password reset questions to
compromise user accounts and stalking). Using the online social footprints collected
in the previous chapter, we measure user’s susceptibility towards the attacks. Finally,
we apply information cloaking to reduce the amount of information leakage.
• Chapter VIII: Reverse Social-Engineering – In most online communities, friends
of a user are given a higher level of trust and access to personal information on the
user. We study reverse social engineering attacks, or social engineering attacks in
which the target user interacts with the attacker given certain indirect stimuli. That
is, we discuss and show how attackers, in practice, can abuse some of the friend-finding
features that online social networks provide with the aim of launching reverse social
engineering attacks and friending other users. Finally, we discuss mitigation methods
to secure information on online communities.




In this chapter we cover some of the fundamental techniques commonly used through this
dissertation. Topics include machine learning and dimensionality reduction.
2.1 Supervised learning
Supervised learning [58] is a branch of machine learning which uses labeled data to infer a
function to label future data. An input instance, usually a set of features, are provided to
a learning algorithm with a set of corresponding labels (such as “Spam” and “Not-spam”).
The supervised learning algorithm takes these inputs and infers a function which provides
labels to most of the input data. In most cases, we use learning algorithms which infer
functions that provide discrete labels (i.e. on a set of possible values), and these are known
as classification algorithms or classifiers. Functions inferred by these classifiers are often
referred to as classification models (or models). The input to these functions are referred
to as attributes or instances, with each set of attributes or features corresponding to a
particular data instance (akin to a data point), and the output representing a class label.
In evaluating supervised learning algorithms, classification is generally performed in two
stages: 1) training or building a model on part of the labeled data; 2) testing or measuring
performance of the classifier on a withheld part of labeled data. This method is called
cross-validation [57] and is performed by creating random partitions of the labeled data
into test and training sets. Unless otherwise specified, we perform 10-fold cross-validation
in our experiments, where a single fold is one run of the cross-validation technique.
Cross-validation is also useful in preventing over-fitting – over-fitting occurs when a
classifier learns the training data extremely well, such that it performs poorly on test data.
We omit the details of using cross-validation for this purpose as it is out of scope of this
dissertation. Stone provides a good explanation of the technique in his work [92].
Supervised learning algorithms are commonly used in security applications, especially in
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applications to determine importance, spamminess, or priority of documents and messages.
A concrete example would be a spam email filter being trained on spam and legitimate
emails, followed by being applied to new incoming emails providing the label “Spam” or
“Not-spam” based on the previously learned model of “Spam”/“Not-spam”.
2.1.1 Standard Supervised Learning Algorithms
We use a number of standard supervised learning algorithms, which we discuss below:
2.1.1.1 Näıve Bayes
Näıve Bayes [17, 71] is a probabilistic classifier which uses Bayes theorem [19] to calculate
the probability of an instance belonging to a class given the set of features in the instance.
One of the characteristic features of näıve Bayes is the strong assumption of independence
between each pair of input attributes on the output class – namely, näıve Bayes assumes
that a feature value is independent of any other feature value, given the output class.
Calculating the probability of a class given a single feature would use the standard Bayes
theorem below, where C is the class and F represents the feature:
P(C|F ) := P(F |C)P(C)P(F )
Extending this to a set of features, the joint probability of a class label can be calculated
using:
P(C|F1, . . . , Fn) := P(F1,...,Fn|C)P(C)P(F1,...,Fn)
When calculating themaximum a posteriori label, the term P(F1, . . . , Fn) can be dropped
as it is independent of C. Also due to the strong assumption of independence between fea-
tures, we can further simplify the formula to:
P(C|F1, . . . , Fn) := P(F1|C)P(F2|C) . . .P(Fn|C)P(C)
Näıve Bayes is well suited for high dimensionality data primarily because the assumption
of independence between attributes results in a low computation cost and alleviates e"ects
of the curse of dimensionality. This has made näıve Bayes one of the standard algorithms
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applied to problems requiring text-classification. Although intuitively one might expect
the assumption of independence between features to result in poor performance, it has
been shown in practice to evenly match and even outperform sophisticated classification
methods. Further, the näıve Bayes classifier can be easily trained as a passive or active
learning classifier.
2.1.1.2 C4.5 Decision Trees
A C4.5 decision tree is a decision tree classifier. It uses a top-down approach in building the
decision tree. At the root node, it picks a feature with the highest normalized Information
Gain (explained in Section 2.3). Subsequent splits are made at each of the branches using
features with the highest information gain on the subset of data. Complexities of this
algorithm including the branch-pruning and handling of continuous features (as opposed to
discrete features) are omitted. Details can be found in Quinlan’s book [82].
Determining labels for new instances of data is fairly quick with decision trees – the
primary reason being that determining a class label involves a traversal of the tree to a leaf.
Further, this algorithm is commonly used due to the decision trees being easily readable
and providing insight when analyzing results.
2.1.1.3 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier creates a decision boundary in hyperspace
which achieves maximum separation of the data points. In this case, each data instance is
considered an N-dimensional data point, where every dimension corresponds to a feature. A
simple SVM providing a hyperplane separating the data points can be calculated by solving










subject to (for any i = 1, . . . , n)
yi(w · xi " b) # 1" #i, #i # 0
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where w is the normal vector to the hyperplane, xi is a particular data point, C a constant,
b is the o"set, and #i is a slack variable – slack variables allow for misclassifications, but
still maximizing the distances to the nearest cleanly split examples.
Given that there are often sets of data points which are not linearly separable a com-
mon technique used is applying a function – called a Kernel Function due to properties of
specific functions usable for this purpose – to map the data points to a higher-dimension.
This ideally will make the points easily separable. Unless mentioned otherwise, we use a
polynomial kernel function for high-dimensional data and a radial basis function (RBF)
kernel function otherwise.
2.1.1.4 Boosting
A Boosting classifier is a meta-classifier that uses a set of weak learning algorithms to create
a strong learning algorithm. Weak learning algorithms are simply classifiers which provide
better than random accuracy when classifying data. Typical weak learning algorithms
include a decision stump or a single node neural network.
We use a popular variant of boosting, namely AdaBoost (Adaptive Boosting), which
increases the importance of misclassified instances on every iteration of the boosting algo-
rithm. Thus, at every successive iteration of the boosting algorithm focuses on classifying
misclassified instances and the overall meta-classifier increases in accuracy. We use Ad-
aBoost with Decision Stumps as the results of the classification with them are easily read-
able and provides insight when analyzing results. Generally only weak learners are used
with boosting, otherwise the meta-model can become increasingly complex and over-fitting
can occur.
2.1.1.5 Decision Stump
A Decision Stump is a single-level decision tree. Similar to decision trees, a feature is
picked with the highest normalized Information Gain (explained in Section 2.3) for the
single internal node. Branches from this internal node lead to leaves nodes (or class labels).
Due to the simplicity of this classifier, we use it to see how easily a class can be parti-
tioned using a single feature. Also as Decision Stumps are weak learners, they are used as
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Table 1: List of classifiers used with categorical features.
Algorithm Type Classifier
AdaBoost AdaBoostM1 (w/ DecisionStump)
Artificial Neural Network Multilayer Perceptron (MLP)
C4.5 Decision Tree J48
Decision Stump DecisionStump
Näıve Bayes Naive Bayes
Support Vector Machine SMO (w/ PolyKernel)
components of other learning algorithms, such as Boosting algorithms.
2.1.2 Implementation of Supervised Learning Algorithms
We use the standard implementation of supervised machine learning algorithms from Weka
3.6.1 [103]. Table 1 lists the standard classifier names as well as the name of the standard
algorithm as implemented by Weka.
2.1.3 Evaluation Criteria
We compare classifier performance using the false-positive (FP) errors, false-negative (FN)
errors, area under the curve (AUC) and F1-measure as our evaluation metrics. To define
these metrics, we first review the set of possible outcomes of a single classification using a
confusion matrix:
Table 2: Confusion matrix
Predicted Actual Label
Label Class A Class B
Class A True-Positive (TP) False-Positive (FP)
Class B False-Negative (FN) True-Negative (TN)
Assuming our labels are spam and non-spam, the false-positive and false-negative rep-
resent the number of spam instances classified as non-spam and the number of non-spam
instances misclassified as spam, respectively.
The AUC can be intuitively thought of as a measure of the detection trade-o" between
FPs and TPs. It is calculated based upon the received operator characteristic (ROC)
curve, which measures the trade-o" between FP-rate and TP-rate. Using a classifier which
produces a probability of an instance belonging to a particular classes, the trade-o" can
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simply be adjusted by varying a decision threshold, adjusting one’s tolerance towards higher
FPs and TPs or vice-versa. Examples of such classifiers are neural networks and näıve Bayes.
ROC curves can also be applied to discrete classifiers (output binary decisions instead of
probabilities), but this usually results in a graph with a single point. Due to the skewed
number of positive (non-spam) instances versus negative (spam) instances, the AUC might
not always be proportional to the total number of FPs and TPs because it relies on the rate
of such FPs and TPs.
The F-measure is a weighted harmonic mean between the precision and recall. Precision
is a measure of the fraction of actual positive labels found by the classifier in relation to
all positive labels found by the classifier, given by TPTP + FP . Recall is a measure of the
fraction of positive labels found by the classifier in relation to all actual positive labels,
given by TPTP + FN . Finally the F-measure is given by
(1+"2)"TP
"2"TP+FP+FN . The F1-measure is the
F-measure with the value of $ set to 1.
2.2 Standard Unsupervised Learning Algorithms
Unsupervised learning is a branch of machine learning which tries to group similar instances
within unlabeled data. More formally this can be thought of identifying structure within un-
labeled data. With unlabeled data, the learning algorithms rely on density estimation. The
main unsupervised algorithms used are Expectation-Maximization [32] and K-Means [68].
We do not discuss details of these algorithms here as unsupervised learning (or clus-
tering) was mainly used in mining the data when trying to explain results or phenomena
observed.
2.3 Dimensionality Reduction
Dimensionality reduction is the process of reducing the number of dimensions being con-
sidered by a classifier. We focus primarily on feature selection, which involves choosing
a subset of features—typically the strongest ones. Methods for feature selection include
information gain and the !2 test.
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2.3.1 Information Gain
Information Gain, from an information theory perspective, is a measure of the amount
of expected reduction in entropy if one were to use the feature (f) to partition instances
belonging to a class (c), from instances not belonging in a class. In other words, it is a
measure of the expected reduction in entropy if using a feature to predict the class outcome.
After calculating the amount of Information Gain for each feature, we pick the strongest
features.
2.3.2 !2 Test
The !2 test is another measure of how well a feature predicts a class. More precisely, it
measure the lack of independence between a feature (f) and the class (c). The !2 test takes
into account values from a two-way contingency table between f and c, which represents
the number of times f and c co-occur, the number of times f occurs without c, and so-forth.
Higher values of the !2 test indicate a stronger discriminative power.
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PREVENTING ABUSE OF ONLINE COMMUNITIES
PART I




EVOLUTION OF PHISHING ATTACKS
Phishing is an online form of pretexting, a kind of deception in which an attacker pretends
to be someone else in order to obtain sensitive information from the victim. Phishing is a
significant practical problem, with reported accumulated loss of $3.2 billion in 2007 [70].
Due to the immediate monetary rewards from the sensitive information stolen (e.g. user
account name and password), financial institutions such as PayPal, eBay, and banks have
been the primary brands a"ected by phishing attacks [70].
The typical communication medium phishing attacks use is email, forged to look like it
is from a legitimate organization. The email usually informs the victims of a problem with
their account and directs them to take remedial action by entering personal information or
logging into their account at a fake website. Although phishing has already spread to other
online communities, such as instant messaging, where phishing was first reported [6], and
voice-over-IP (a.k.a. vishing) [97], the focus of this study is email-based phishing due to its
prevalence and data availability.
It is non-trivial to distinguish phishing messages from legitimate messages, since phishing
messages are constructed to resemble legitimate messages as much as possible. The defensive
techniques used to identify phishing messages commonly include collaborative filtering (e.g.
user reports), blacklisting (e.g. URLs collected from honeypot email accounts) [7, 12], and
text classification combined with similarity testing methods (e.g. minor variations of known
phishing messages). Although collaborative filtering and blacklisting can be e"ective after
an initial positive identification, they contain a lag time during which some percentage
of the phishing messages reach the victims. Due to the similarity between phishing and
legitimate messages (by design), spam-filter style text classification filters have di!culties
working alone and are typically used in combination with similarity tests and blacklists.
Not surprisingly, phishing message producers change the content or format of phishing
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messages when they realize that previous messages have been identified or blacklisted. This
constant evolution of phishing attacks results in an arms race between the generation of
new phishing messages and defenses used to identify them, in an area known as adversarial
classification [30].
This chapter describes an evolutionary study of phishing on a large dataset containing
more than 380,000 phishing messages collected over 15 months. We aim to identify evolu-
tionary trends in construction techniques used in phishing messages (such as construction
techniques that appear and disappear). The analytical methods used are similar to a previ-
ous study on the evolution of spam messages [81]. In the study of spam messages, we were
able to identify clear evolutionary trends of spam construction techniques in spam messages
(namely extinction and co-existence of features) and their correlation with factors such as
environmental changes and spam filtering techniques.
The main results of the study on phishing messages are a classification of phishing
messages and a corresponding classification of phishing construction techniques. To this
end, we identify phishing campaigns within the phishing messages by using de-duplication
techniques. We find that message duplication ranges from 36.7% to 81.4% per month
and given that most of these campaigns demonstrate a bursty behavior, we refer to the
individual campaigns as attacks. Our first result is that phishing messages can be divided
into two groups: flash attacks and non-flash attacks. Flash attacks are characterized by a
large volume of phishing messages in a single campaign sent within a short period of time.
Non-flash attack messages are spread over a relatively longer time span but maintain their
identifiable similarity. Our second result is that the phishing message features we found can
be divided into two groups: transitory features and pervasive features. Transitory features
are short lived and appear in a small number of attacks, whereas pervasive features have a
relatively longer lifetime and appear in a larger number of attacks.
While these classifications are very useful in helping us understand phishing messages,
they also show the limitations of current techniques and tools to identify phishing messages.
As a concrete example, the transitory features can be used by email filters since they
are strong indicators of phishing messages, but their transitory nature shows the phishing
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Figure 1: Example of a raw PayPal phishing message (see Figure 2 for rendered version)
message producers know this and adapt by eliminating these strong indicators in subsequent
generations of phishing messages. Another example is the appearance of pervasive features
in both phishing and legitimate messages, thus making them weak selectors in email filters.
Consequently, our results also show the strong need for further study of phishing message
identification.
3.1 Background
Phishing attacks are often filtered in a manner similar to that of spam, yet spam identifi-
cation techniques applied naively to phishing messages will have a high miss rate. In this
section we give an overview of the similarities and di"erences between phishing and spam,
and then discuss the anatomy of a phishing attack.
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3.1.1 Comparison to spam
The purpose of a phishing message is to acquire sensitive information about a user. In
order to do so, the message needs to deceive the intended recipient into believing it is from
a legitimate organization. As a form of deception, a phishing message contains no useful
information for the intended recipient and thus falls under the category of spam.
Although phishing is categorized as spam, it also di"ers from spam. Amongst other
things, spam tries to sell a product or service, while a phishing message needs to look like
it is from a legitimate organization. Due to the similarity between phishing and legitimate
messages, techniques that are applied to spam messages cannot be applied naively to phish-
ing messages. For example, text-based classification [29,64,86] can perform reasonably well
in identifying spam, but as a phishing message is forged to look like a message from a
legitimate organization, text-based classification [35] applied naively to a phishing message
will have a high miss rate.
3.1.2 Anatomy of a phishing message
A raw phishing message (Figure 1) can be split into two components: the content and the
headers. These components are commonly accepted as being the major components of a
message. We will use these components as a natural way to group features in the later part
of the chapter.
3.1.2.1 Content
The content is the part of the message that the user sees and is used by phishing message
producers to deceive users. It can be subdivided into two parts.
1. The cover is the content which is made to look like a message from the legitimate
organization, and usually informs the user of a problem with their account. Early
phishing messages could be identified based only on their cover, due to imperfect
grammar or spelling mistakes (which are uncommon in legitimate messages). Over
time, the covers used in phishing messages have become more sophisticated, to the
point where they even warn the users about protecting their password and avoiding
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Figure 2: Example of a rendered PayPal phishing message
fraud. An example of this can be seen in Figure 2, where the phishing message tells
the victim to “Protect Your Account Info” by making sure “you never provide your
password to fraudulent websites”.
2. The sting is the part of the content that directs the victim to take remedial actions. It
usually takes the form of a clickable URL that directs the victim to a fake website to
log into their account or enter other personal details. We call this the sting, as this is
the part of the content that inflicts pain, by means of financial loss or other undesirable
action after the victim enters their details on the website. Typically the sting is hidden
by using HTML to display a legitimate looking address, instead of the address of the
fake website. An example of this is shown in Figure 1 where the address of the fake
website is http://www.nutristore.com.au/r.htm and the corresponding displayed




The headers are the part of the message which is primarily used by the mail servers and
the mail client to determine where the message is going and how to unpack the message.
Most users do not see these headers, but in terms of determining if a message is phishing
or not, this part of the message can be quite useful.
Headers can be subdivided into three parts based on the entities which add them to the
message:
1. Mail clients typically add headers such as “To:”, “From:”, “Subject:” and some client
specific headers. Examples of mail client headers are X-MSMail-Priority, X-Mailer,
and X-MimeOLE, and they can be seen in Figure 1. Phishing messages may try to
fake a particular header and in doing so, give away that the message is fake. For
example, if the X-Mailer header indicates that a HTML message has been composed
using MS Outlook but the message only contains HTML (without plain-text), this
is an indication that the message is fake, as MS Outlook cannot send HTML only
messages.
2. Mail relays will add headers along the path of the message. These are usually “Re-
ceived” headers, which can be used to determine the originating IP of the message
and the path taken by the message.
3. Spam-filters or virus-scanners will usually add headers to the message to indicate
results of the tests run over the message. These headers can then be used by the
receiving client to determine (based on a user-set threshold) what to do with the
message.
3.2 Message Analysis
Existing email filters use a number of techniques to try and detect phishing. Some filters are
based on the content of a message and use content-based collaborative filtering or text-based
classification. Other filters look deeper into the construction techniques or characteristics
of a message and use these as features upon which they classify.
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In terms of detecting phishing using content, text-based classification (such as that
used in spam) does not seem to be the best approach due to phishing messages containing
text similar to that of legitimate e-mails. Content-based collaborative filtering might be a
more e"ective content-based technique if messages have a long lifetime and a large amount
of duplication. In relation to this, we measure the prevalence of duplication in phishing
messages and the lifetime of duplicated messages.
Email filters which use construction techniques or characteristics of a message for clas-
sification are most e"ective if the feature has a long lifetime and is widely used among
phishing attacks. We look at the extent to which a feature is used among phishing attacks
and the lifetime of the feature. In addition, we comment on whether the feature is a strong
feature (i.e. characteristic of phishing messages and does not appear in legitimate messages)
or not.
3.2.1 Phishing dataset
For our analysis of phishing messages, we used messages provided by a large anti-phishing
organization. The dataset contained over 1.8 million spam and phishing messages spanning
15 months from August 2006 to December 2007. The messages were submitted by users
and partners of the organization as well as domain spam filtering services.
We received the dataset with each message in its own mbox, compressed and grouped
by month. To avoid mis-grouped messages from adding noise to the data, we uncompressed
all the messages into a single folder and sorted the messages based on their first “Received:”
header. The first “Received:” header is the most reliable indication of when the message
was actually delivered as it is added by the last mail relay on the path to the intended
recipient and is the least susceptible to being forged. The “Date:” header can be forged
and hence was not used.
3.2.2 Identifying phishing messages
The dataset we received contained both spam and phishing messages. We wanted our
characterization to be limited to phishing messages, so we only used conservative techniques
to identify them. We believe that this is not a limiting factor in our analysis, as the methods
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we use are robust enough to be applied to larger versions of phishing corpora as well. We
used three techniques to identify phishing messages.
First, we used phishing-related tests from spam-filters such as SpamAssassin. An exam-
ple of a test we looked for was a SpamAssassin test called TVD EB PHISH. TVD EB PHISH
checks if the message is from eBay.com and if the body of the message contains an IP based
URL. IP based URLs are used by phishing message producers to host fake websites o" of
compromised machines that do not have DNS entries.
Second, we used headers added by domain spam filtering services. Domain spam filtering
services work by taking over the Mail Exchange (MX) record of a domain, running tests
on the incoming messages and then forwarding the messages to the true mail server of a
domain. Usually the results of the tests run over the messages are added to the headers
(e.g. X-Phishing, X-SpamSave) to indicate whether a message is phishing or not. Domain
spam filtering services do not reveal the exact rules or tests that they use to determine
whether a message is phishing or not, but to our knowledge (and as mentioned by one
such spam filtering service [1]) they use a combination of techniques which include running
SpamAssassin, URL blacklists, and checking message hashes against a database of reported
phishing messages.
Lastly, we ran our own tests over the URLs in a message. Our tests check if the URL
matches certain patterns which phishing message producers use to fool users into believing
the URL is a legitimate address. One such pattern is if the URL contains a legitimate
domain as part of a sub-domain or as part of the URL request (For example http://www.
paypal.com.phishingsite.co.uk/ or http://www.phishingsite.com/paypal.com/).
Using the above techniques we identified 382,377 phishing messages. The distribution
of all the messages in the dataset and the distribution of only the phishing messages in the
dataset are shown in Figure 3.
3.3 Phishing Content Characterization
To better understand how e"ective content-based collaborative filtering might be, we inves-



















Figure 3: Distribution of phishing messages
• To what extent does duplication occur in phishing messages?
• What is the lifetime of phishing content?
As mentioned earlier, content-based collaborative filtering would be more e"ective if there
was a large amount of duplication and if messages have a long lifetime.
3.3.1 Duplication of phishing content
To help understand the uniqueness of phishing messages, we clustered the messages in our
dataset based on their rendered content (i.e., the content the user views after a email client
has rendered the message’s HTML content). Specifically, we used the shingling algorithm
from our previous work [99] to construct equivalence classes of duplicate and near-duplicate
phishing messages. Shingling provides a fuzzy approach for message comparison. In ad-
dition, it provides a storage e!cient manner to represent and a computationally e!cient
manner to compare document similarity for a large number of documents.
The shingling algorithm we use was first discussed by Broder et al. [24], and it uses a
deterministic sampling technique to map a message to a small representative set of shingles.
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Messages are considered duplicates if they map onto the same set of shingles1 and near-
duplicates if they map onto similar sets of shingles. Although we use a standard version of
the shingling algorithm, we discuss the basic steps for those not familiar with the technique.
For a more detailed description of this shingling algorithm, please consult [36–38].
First every message’s rendered content was tokenized into a collection of words, where
a word is defined as an uninterrupted series of alphanumeric characters. Then, for every
message, we created a fingerprint for each of its n words using a Rabin fingerprinting func-
tion [83] (with a degree 64 primitive polynomial pA). After we had the n word fingerprints,
we combined them into 5-word phrases. The collection of word fingerprints was treated
like a circle (i.e. the first fingerprint follows the last fingerprint) so that every fingerprint
started a phrase, which resulted in n 5-word phrases. Next, we generated n phrase finger-
prints for the n 5-word phrases using another Rabin fingerprinting function (with a degree
64 primitive polynomial pB). Once we obtained the n phrase fingerprints, we applied 84
unique Rabin fingerprinting functions (with degree 64 primitive polynomials p1, ..., p84) to
each of the n phrase fingerprints, and for every one of the 84 functions, the smallest of the
n fingerprints was stored. At the end of this process, each phishing message was reduced
to 84 fingerprints, which are that message’s shingles. After all of the phishing messages
were converted to a collection of 84 shingles, we clustered them into equivalence classes (i.e.
clusters of duplicate or near-duplicate messages).
From properties of the shingling algorithm, if two messages are 95% similar, then the
probability that at least two out of the six possible non-overlapping collections match is
almost 90%. If two messages are 80% similar the probability of at least two out of the
six possible non-overlapping collections matching is instead only 2.6%. Two messages were
considered duplicates if all of their shingles matched, and they were near-duplicates if their
shingles agreed in two out of the six possible non-overlapping collections of 14 shingles.
We ran our shingling algorithm on the phishing messages, clustering duplicate and near-
duplicate messages together. We were left with 137,151 unique clusters, shown in Figure 4
1The shingling algorithm will map a message A and message AA (message A twice) to the same set of



















Figure 4: Distribution of Cluster Sizes (Note the Log-Log Scale)
as a distribution of of cluster sizes. From this figure, we observe that 120,439 of the clus-
ters contain a single message. These phishing messages are truly unique because no other
message in our dataset shares content with them. On the other end of the spectrum we find
the largest 15 clusters containing 37,897 phishing messages, or approximately 2,526 mes-
sages per cluster. Interestingly, the remaining 16,697 clusters account for 224,041 phishing
messages which means if we can identify a phishing message from the 16,697 clusters, we
will be able to identify an additional 13 phishing messages on average.
Overall, only 35.9% of phishing messages are unique, and the remaining 64.1% of the
messages derive their content from those unique messages. Figure 5 shows the duplica-
tion percentage by month and we see that it is significant ranging from 36.7% to 81.4%
throughout the period of our data.
3.3.2 Lifetime of phishing content
To get an idea of the lifetime of a phishing content, we used the previously created clusters.
We sorted them by size and picked the top 15 clusters for our analysis. For example, the
top 5 clusters can be seen in Table 3.
Using the top 15 clusters, we observed that the lifetime of a cluster ranged from a month






















Figure 5: Phishing message duplication by month
in the number of messages sent in a month and is indicative of an attack. Based on the
intensity and duration of the bursty behavior, we separated the clusters into two groups:
flash attacks and non-flash attacks. Flash attacks are characterized by a high-intensity2
uni-peak with a very short lifetime (under 4 months). Non-flash attacks are characterized
by low- to medium-intensity multi-peaks and have a longer lifetime. These clusters persist
from 4 to 11 months, with an average of about 8 months.
The graphed distribution of the top 15 clusters from August 2006 to December 2007 is
omitted due to its complexity, but instead we show the top 15 clusters grouped by flash and
non-flash attacks in Figures 6 and 7. The graphs label each cluster with its short descriptive
name as well as the cluster’s position in terms of size (i.e., “eBay - Malicious activity (9)”
refers to a message from eBay regarding “Malicious activity” and is the 9th largest cluster).
Overall, of the top 15 clusters, eight clusters were flash-attacks (shown in Figure 6),
which total 22,197 phishing messages, and the other seven clusters were non-flash attacks
(shown in Figure 7), which total 15,700 phishing messages.








































Corp A - Account confirmation (1)
Corp A - Access limited (2)
Corp A - Update records (3)
Corp B - Late payment (4)
Corp B - Malicious activity (9)
Corp D - New security (10)
Corp C - Survey w/ reward (14)
Corp A - Access limited (15)
Figure 6: Clusters from Top 15 exhibiting “Flash attack” behavior
Table 3: Five largest clusters
Description Messages
Corp A - Account confirmation 4091
Corp A - Access limited 3849
Corp A - Update records 3701
Corp B - Late payment 2948
Corp A - Verify account 2705
3.3.3 Discussion
We see from our results that phishing messages have a significant amount of duplication –
averaging 64.1% and ranging from 36.7% to 81.4% on a month to month basis. We also
found that for phishing messages categorized as flash attacks, there is a large amount of
duplication in a short period of time. To filter these kinds of phishing messages a content-
based collaborative filter would have to be responsive enough to detect these quickly. For
phishing messages categorized as non-flash attacks, the amount of duplication is spread out
over a much longer period, and a content-based collaborative filter would be very e"ective






































Corp A - Verify account (5)
Corp A - Access limited 2 (6)
Corp A - Payment confirmation (7)
Corp A - E-mail change (8)
Corp A - E-mail change 2 (11)
Corp E - Malicious activity (12)
Corp A - Malicious activity 2 (13)
Figure 7: Phishing clusters from Top 15 exhibiting “Non-flash attack” behavior
3.4 Phishing Features Characterization
Having studied the content of phishing messages, we next answered similar questions about
the construction techniques or characteristics of a message. Specifically we wanted to an-
swer:
• Is a feature transitory (used only once or twice), or is it pervasive (used in many
clusters)?
• If it was used in many clusters, what was its lifetime?
3.4.1 Features
A feature can be any construction technique or characteristic of a phishing message that
can be identified by running a test over the raw message. We represent a feature with
a mnemonic name using Java variable naming convention. An example of a feature is
htmlMessage, which identifies a message containing HTML; Table 4 lists additional example
features with brief descriptions. Most of the features we used are binary in nature, but we
also had numeric and text features. Binary features are used to identify the result of a
binary feature in the message. For example, the binary test scriptInHtml is a check of
whether the HTML contains the “script” tag. Numeric features can be decimal values,
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Table 4: List of selected features with brief descriptions
Feature Name Description
forgedMuaOutlook Forged mail pretending to be from MS Outlook.
hideWinStatus Hide actual link by changing the displayed URL using
“onmouseover”.
htmlMessage Message contains HTML.
htmlMimeNoHtmlTag HTML message, but no HTML tag.
htmlTagBalanceBody HTML message has unbalanced body tags.
mimeBoundDigits Spam tool pattern (contains digits only) in MIME bound-
ary.
mimeHtmlOnly Message only has text/html MIME parts.
mimeHtmlOnlyMulti Multipart message has text/html MIME parts only.
missingMimeOle Message has X-MSMail-Priority, but no X-MimeOLE.
msgidFromMtaHeader Message-ID from MTA header.
msgidSpamCaps Spam tool Message-ID (CAPS).
mpartAltDi" HTML and text parts are di"erent.
msoeMidWrongCase MS Outlook Express Message-ID wrong case.
normalHttpToIp Dotted-decimal IP address in URL.
partCidStock Spammy image attachment (by stock Content-ID).
scriptInHtml HTML contains “script” tag.
phSubjAccountsPost Subject contains particular words (Activate, Verify, Re-
store, Flagged, Limited, . . . ).
phRec Message has standard phishing phrase “your account
record”.
urlHex URL contains Hex characters.
weirdPort Non-standard port number for HTTP.
or they can be counts. For example, the numeric feature htmlImageRatio has a decimal
value that identifies the ratio of text to image area in a message, and the numeric feature
numMimeParts has a count value, which identifies the number of MIME parts in a message.
Text features are used in cases where we can run some post-processing and grouping over
the feature. mimePartFileResult is an example of a text feature that stores the result of
the linux command “file” on each MIME part of a message.
In order to have a comprehensive set of features, we defined 97 of our own features in
addition to adopting over 600 features from SpamAssassin’s non-network tests3. We do not
describe all the features in detail, but instead describe the major feature groups and provide
an example for each grouping (shown in Table 5).
3We used SpamAssassin 3.2.4, which was the latest version as of March 2008
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Features for tests that are
run over the headers of the
phishing message.
msgidSpamCaps is a binary feature that iden-
tifies a message where the Message-Id con-




Features for tests that are
run over the content of the
phishing message.
mimeHtmlOnly is a binary feature that iden-




Features for tests that are
run over the URLs in
HTML and text parts of a
message.
numDomainDots is a numeric feature that is
a count of the number of dots in the domain
part of the URL.
Meta
features
Features which represent a
combination of features.
ppPhish is a binary feature that identifies a
message as a PayPal phishing message, if it
is from PayPal (fromPayPal) and contains an
IP address in the URL (normalHttpToIp).
3.4.2 Characterizing features
To start, we identified all the features in each cluster. This was done by running all the tests
over the messages belonging to the cluster. We then grouped together all the flash attack
and non-flash attack clusters containing a particular feature and separated the features into
two categories: transitory features and pervasive features.
For each feature we graphed the percentage of the number of messages within a cluster
(on the y-axis) that satisfied a certain condition (i.e. positive test for a binary feature; a
numeric feature above a certain threshold) against the period of data collection (on the
x-axis). The graphs (Figure 8 to Figure 9(a)) in this chapter follow the same format and
include only flash attack clusters. This is mainly due to the relatively small overlap between
clusters, reducing clutter and making the graphs far more readable. Further, to reduce the
noise in the graphs, we omitted a data point if it represented less than 1% of the number
of messages in that month (typically toward the beginning or the end of the flash attack
cluster’s lifetime).
Transitory features are characterized as being used in only one or few clusters that occur
within a short period of each other. Table 6 shows the transitory features in groups similar
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Figure 8(a) shows phSub-
jAccountsPost is used in
















Figure 8(b) shows htmlMi-
meNoHtmlTag used in 100%













Figure 8(c) shows normal-
HttpToIp used in 100%,
98%, and 97% of the “Pay-
Pal - Account confirmation
(1)”, “PayPal - Access lim-
ited (2)”, and “eBay - Late




None significant None significant Not applicable
to those used by the grouping of features earlier. Overall, 9 of the 12 clusters have transitory
features, which shows that not only does the content of a phishing message change, but in
most cases the features vary as well.
Pervasive features are characterized as being used in many clusters and have a relatively
long lifetime. Table 7 shows the pervasive features in groups similar to those used by the
grouping of features earlier. Overall, we see that each pervasive feature is used in a large
number of clusters and in some cases in all the clusters.
3.4.3 Discussion
From our results we see that phishing messages have features which are both pervasive and
transitory. We found most of the transitory features of phishing to be strong indicators of
a phishing message (the feature is not used in legitimate messages) which might indicate
the reason these features are transitory. Further we find that the pervasive features are
mostly weak indicators of a phishing message (the feature appears in legitimate messages
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Figure 9(a) shows forgedMuaOutlook used in 4 flash
attack clusters over a period of 9 months and all 7





Figure 9(b) shows mimeHtmlOnly used in 6 flash at-
tack clusters over a period of 9 months and all 7 non-
flash attack clusters over a period of 17 months.
URL
features
None significant Not applicable.
Meta
features
None significant Not applicable.
as well). This suggests phishing message producers limit the utility of transitory features in
time (by avoiding them in future generations of phishing) and limit the utility of pervasive
features by choosing features that also appear in legitimate messages. The results suggest
that classification techniques which use features will need to be constantly updated with
newer features or find strong indicators of phishing that are less transitory.
3.5 Related Work
Previous studies on the evolution of phishing have been mainly focused on the meta-content
of phishing messages. The Anti-Phishing Work Group (APWG) publishes monthly trend
reports (e.g. [8]) that consider organizations targeted (e.g. PayPal, eBay), countries in which
phishing websites are hosted and volume. Similarly, Marshal published two security threat
reports during 2007 [9, 10] which looks at similar meta-content characteristics of phishing
(organizations targeted, country of origin and volume) were discussed. Interestingly, they
do identify a particular group as being responsible for over half of all phishing messages
but do not go into details or analyze the techniques used in the group’s phishing messages.
RSA [11] also looked at trends in the meta-content of phishing messages, but also identified
emerging techniques being used by phishers.
Beardsley [20] deconstructed and manually analyzed an attack from 2004. He observed
some advanced elements of the phishing attack like cross-site scripting (XSS) and other
elements which are “common to virtually all phishing scams”.
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Our study di"ers from the previous work on the evolution of phishing in several ways.
First, we study unique clusters of messages and how they evolve, in terms of content and
construction techniques used in creating the clusters. Second, our study analyzes 382,377
phishing messages over a 15 month period to produce clear and tangible evidence of evolu-
tion.
3.6 Conclusion
We analyze the evolution of phishing message content and phishing construction techniques
in a large dataset of phishing messages (more than 380,000 messages over a 15 months
period). From the content similarity point of view, the phishing messages are grouped into
identifiable “attack campaigns” using a shingling algorithm as similarity test. These attack
campaigns are then classified as either a flash attacks (a large volume of phishing messages
sent in a short time) or non-flash attacks (similar messages spread over a longer period
of time). Similarly, we group phishing construction techniques into: transitory features
that are associated with a few clusters and are short lived; and pervasive features that are
associated with a large number of clusters and have a long life span.
Our results provide a better understanding of phishing messages, both in terms of attack
behavior and phishing identification features. However, our study also illustrates the need
for further research on phishing. The large amount of duplication could be cause to look
into signature-based content filters. Also, the strong indicators of phishing turned out to
be transitory and therefore have limited utility for email filters. The pervasive features also
have limited utility due the presence of these features in legitimate messages. These findings
show the adaptive construction of phishing messages in each attack, carefully removing the
transitory features that cause their identification by email filters. A serious challenge in














































CorpA - Access limited (2)








































CorpB - Malicious activity (9)








































CorpA - Account confirmation (1)
CorpA - Access limited (2)
CorpB - Late payment(4)
(c) Transitory URL features









































CorpA - Update records (3)
CorpB - Late payment (4)
CorpC - Survey w/ reward (14)
CorpA - Access limited 2 (15)








































CorpA - Access limited (2)
CorpA - Update records (3)
CorpB - Late payment (4)
CorpA - Malicious activity (9)
CorpC - Survey w/ reward (14)
CorpA - Access limited 2 (15)
(b) Pervasive content feature
Figure 9: Illustration of pervasive features in di"erent groups.
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CHAPTER IV
DETECTION OF SOCIAL SPAM PROFILES USING STATIC
CONTENT
Social networks have grown to become an important part of social interactions for personal
and business reasons. Consequently, spammers have targeted social networks as media
for propagating spam. Unlike email, interactions within current social networks such as
MySpace and Facebook are restricted to members of the same social network. Consequently,
spam must originate from a profile inside the social network. Although the maintenance of
such rogue profiles (usually called “spam profiles”) is a deterrent, it has not stopped the
proliferation of spam in social networks [101].
Anecdotal evidence indicates that techniques used by social network operators to detect
rogue profiles in practice include collaborative filtering and behavioral analysis. Dynamic
methods such as collaborative filtering (where users vote on the nature of profiles) and
behavioral analysis (where logs of interactions are used to detect spamming patterns) may
be eventually able to detect rogue profiles, but they require a non-trivial amount of lag
time to accumulate su!cient evidence. In this chapter, we study the analysis of static user
profile content, which complements the dynamic methods. The main advantage of using
machine learning analysis is that it can be applied as soon as the profiles are created, thus
detecting suspect spam profiles before they have active propagated spam. In compensation,
analysis based on machine learning depends on the quality of training data for an accurate
prediction.
This chapter explores the limits and potential of machine learning analysis on static
profile content at creation time (or within a small time period). To test the limitations on
the accuracy of such analysis, we collected a large corpus of 1.9 million MySpace profiles,
including approximately 1,500 confirmed spam profiles [101]. Our analysis considers two
kinds of data in a social network profile:
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• Categorical data - fields that can take only a limited number of values, for example:
“Sex”, “Age”, and “Relationship Status”.
• Free-form data - usually text information entered by users, for example: “About me”
and “Interests”.
This distinction allows appropriate machine learning algorithms to be applied to di"erent
sections of the data (e.g., decisions trees for categorical data and näıve Bayes for free-form
data). To measure the discriminatory power of features and find the most important features
in the identification of spam profiles, we apply the !2 test to measure the correlation (or
lack of independence) between the features being studied and predicted class (whether a
profile is rogue).
We also compare supervised machine learning techniques in their ability to detect spam
profiles. On categorical data, the classifiers tested are: (1) AdaBoost algorithm (with a
DecisionStump weak-classifier), (2) C4.5 decision tree, (3) Support Vector Machine, and
(4) a neural network-based algorithm. In addition, we use näıve Bayes on the free-form
data to classify rogue profiles.
Lastly, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the classifiers with respect to the evolution
of spam profile content. Evolution of spam content is due to adversarial classification,
where detection measures adopted by a social network can be countered with spammer’s
adaptive modification of the spam profiles to escape detection. Spam content evolution is a
well known and documented phenomenon [46,81]. We evaluate the robustness of classifiers
by simulating adversarial action (e.g., removing the highest discriminative features) and
re-evaluating the e"ectiveness of classifiers under the new assumptions.
Our results show that analysis of static profile content based on machine learning meth-
ods has the potential to improve significantly the detection of rogue profiles in social net-
works with non-trivial user profile content (e.g., MySpace and Facebook). This is particu-
larly the case for recently created rogue profiles that have not engaged in spamming activity.
Since this analysis complements dynamic methods, it has good potential for practical im-
pact.
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Figure 10: Example of a social spam profile
4.1 Social Spam Profiles
Social networks allow users to meet new friends, keep in touch with old friends, and partici-
pate in various social interactions. A user’s presence in a social networking site is represented
by a social profile, which allows him to maintain an identity within a social network and
participate in it.
Spammers looking to propagate spam through a social network need to create a social
profile. Once this social spam profile profile is created, spam can easily be sent out to other
users using mediums o"ered within the community (e.g., friend requests, messaging, and
commenting). Such spam has already been seen in the wild [101], and previous work [100]
has focused on gathering and characterizing such profiles.
An example of a MySpace social spam profile is shown1 in Figure 10. The profile contains
a large amount of personal information, including various deceptive properties. As typical
of spam profiles, this profile portrays an attractive, young, single woman with a provocative
image to entice users to view them. Once the profiles have attracted visitors, they direct
them to perform an action on an external website, usually by providing an alluring story
in their “About me” section. For example, the profile in Figure 10 provides a link to an
external website to “see woman pictures”.
Early and accurate detection of such spam profiles is essential to reducing the amount
1Provocative images have been blurred to avoid o!ending readers.
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of spam on social networks. We explore the benefits and limitations of profile classification
using static user content entered during profile creation (or modification) to determine
whether a profile is spammy or not. Ideally, this technique would be accurate enough to
allow zero-minute determination about whether a profile is spammy or not and prevent
a spammer from gaining an entry point into the social network. In practice, we submit
that this technique would most likely have to be used to lower or raise another technique’s
decision boundary, allowing it to come to a quicker decision.
Current techniques of social spam profile detection [69, 108], rely heavily on detecting
the spamminess of artifacts created by a user profile. For example, they analyze messages,
comments, and friend requests. This approach must wait for the social spam profile to
impact the social network with spam. Also, depending on the discriminatory power of
features based on such artifacts, a large number of artifacts may be required before a
definitive decision can be made.
Some social network sites use collaborative filtering or administrator-based reporting to
manually identify social spam profiles. These techniques also su"er from a lag time between
profile creation and identification, which can result in spam already having impacted users.
Additionally, collaborative filters require that the profiles attract enough votes from other
users to be marked as spam. Higher requirements in the number of votes will result in longer
certainty in the evaluation of spam with a longer time required to reach the threshold, and
vice versa. The benefit to using these dynamic techniques is usually a higher accuracy.
4.2 Experiment Setup
MySpace is one of the largest and most popular social networks, making it a prime target
for social spam. It also features a large amount of personal user content per profile, and
most of the information is publicly viewable by default.
4.2.1 Data Collection
With over 200 million profiles on MySpace, collection of all the profiles would be infeasible
due to computational, storage, and network loads. We previously collected, in June to
September 2006, a small subset of profiles from MySpace using two di"erent sampling
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strategies:
• Top 8 - Starting with a seed list of random profiles, the top 8 most popular friends
were crawled, and subsequently their top 8 most popular friends were crawled in a
breath first search (BFS) manner. This resulted in a collection of 891,167 connected
profiles.
• Random - Profiles were crawled by generating random userid’s and retrieving the
profile represented by that user. This resulted in a collection of 960,505 profiles.
More details regarding these crawls, including an analysis of demographic information and
language model characterization, can be found in our previous work [26].
Spam profiles from MySpace were previously collected by setting up honeypot accounts
and collecting profiles that sent friend requests to these accounts. Fifty-one identical hon-
eypot accounts portraying a fictitious, young, single male were spread over geographical
locations in the United States resulting in 1,496 spam profiles collected from October 2007
to February 2008. The details of the honeypots, the exact methodology used and a study
of demographics of the spam profiles are in our previous work [100].
4.2.2 Datasets
To use supervised learning, we need to provide spam and legitimate (non-spam) labels for
a training set of profiles. We assign labels based on the method of collection with profiles
collected via the honeypots being marked as spam and profiles collected via the top 8 or
random sampling strategies as non-spam. As it was possible that during the top 8 or
random sampling some spam profiles may have been inadvertently crawled, we ran various
heuristics to detect spam profiles within these collections. For example, we used features
from some of the previous work [69,108] in our detection of spam profiles, and we looked for
keywords in free-form text fields with external spammy-looking links. Furthermore, during
our classification experiments, we paid close attention to any misclassification and manually
verified some of the labels.
We created two datasets for classification based on the above features and labels: the top
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Table 8: Subset of fields parsed from a MySpace profile and a brief description of non-
obvious fields.




Smoke Categorical Does smoke?
Drink Categorical Does drink?
Kid Categorical Want kids?
Zodiac Categorical Zodiac sign
Education Categorical Level of education
Orientation Categorical Sexual orientation
About Me Free-form text
8 dataset includes a random sample of 15,000 non-spam (legitimate/ham) profiles from the
top 8 sampling and all 1,496 spam profiles from the honeypot profiles; the random dataset
includes a random sample of 15,000 legitimate profiles from the random sampling and 1,496
spam profiles from the honeypot profiles. The rationale for using a subset of all the data
available is that as legitimate profiles are so dominant, a majority classifier (i.e. a classifier
which picks the dominant label for all profiles), would achieve over a 99.8% accuracy rate.
4.2.3 Feature extraction
Using a custom parser, we extract fields from the MySpace profiles. A subset of these fields
can be found in Table 8 along with a brief description and whether we treat the field as
a categorical feature or a free-form text feature. Most of the categorical data can, with
minimal processing, be used as categorical features for classification. Using a bag-of-words
approach, a free-form text field is broken into multiple features (with each word being a
feature) after the application of stemming and the removal of stop-words. More details on
the features used can be found in Section 4.3.
4.3 Feature Analysis
Before looking at classification, we take a closer look at the zero-minute features available
for classification. These features based on static profile content are evaluated on their
discriminative power and their robustness to adversarial classification.
Discriminative power of a feature can be seen as how strong of a signal it provides in
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determining the resulting class. To compare the discriminative power of features, we use the
!2 test, which measures the lack of independence between a feature f and the class c. The
!2 test takes into account values from a two-way contingency table between f and c, which
represents the number of times f and c co-occur, the number of times f occurs without c,
and so-forth. Higher values of the !2 test indicate a stronger discriminative power.
Robustness to adversarial classification, to a certain extent, is a subjective measure that
we manually assign. It is based upon how easy or di!cult it would be for an adversary to
change a feature in a spam profile in order to evade a classifier. To evade a classifier, the
features need to blend in with the distribution of non-spam profile values without reducing
the e"ectiveness of the spam profile. This can be seen as how easy it is for an adversary to
“switch o"” a signal.
The reason we use these two characteristics to distinguish features is that a highly
discriminatory feature with low robustness would yield very good classification results, but
it would not be very useful over a long period of time against an adversary. This is because a
feature that is not robust could be easily removed by an adversary and would likely degrade
the classification results due to its high discriminatory power. Ideal features would have
both a high discriminative power and high robustness to adversarial classification.
4.3.1 Categorical features
Categorical features are obtained by extracting values from the respective categorical fields.
Categorical fields with text values such as “Gender” and “Orientation” are converted to
nominal values simply by assigning each distinct text value a nominal counterpart. Cat-
egorical fields with numeric values such as “Age” are left as numeric features. Two fields
which are treated in a binary fashion are “IsPrivate” and “DefaultIM” because the only
possible values for those fields are true or false. Although fields like “Smoke”, “Drink”,
and “Kid” could also be treated in this manner, we choose to make a distinction between
whether or not those fields are unanswered by assigning a value of “undef” if the field is
not answered. If a numeric field is unanswered, it is assigned a value of “-1”.
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4.3.1.1 Discriminatory power
Figure 11(a) shows the results of the !2 test on the categorical features for the random and
top 8 datasets. Each feature is represented by a cluster of two bars on the x-axis (one bar
for each dataset), and the y-axis represents the !2 test score.
The features with the highest overall discriminatory power for both the random and
top 8 datasets were “Kid”, “Smoke”, “Drink”, and “DefaultIM”. The “Kid”, “Smoke”, and
“Drink” features are highly discriminative because over 95% of the spam profiles left this
value blank (i.e., they have a value of “undef”), whereas only 15-25% of the non-spam
profiles in the random dataset and 35-50% of the non-spam profiles in the top 8 dataset had
these fields blank. The fewer non-spam profiles in the random dataset having this blank
explains why the discriminatory power was higher as compared to the top 8 dataset. The
“DefaultIM” feature had a very high discriminatory power in the top 8 dataset because
1% of the non-spam profiles left the field blank, whereas the spam profiles and the random
dataset non-spam profiles had a mix of having a blank value or being filled out. It is
surprising to see the “Age” feature as a good discriminator. However, we found that most
non-spam profiles in the random dataset are under the age of 30 (with a peak at 17 years),
and non-spam profiles in the top 8 dataset are under the age of 33 (with a peak at 18 years).
The spam profiles, on the other hand, mimic profiles of young women with ages between 17
and 34 and a peak at 24 years (with over 85% between the age of 21 to 27).
Categorical features with the lowest overall discriminatory power for both the random
and top 8 datasets were “Zodiac” and “IsPrivate”. The reason “Zodiac” has a very low
discriminatory power was that it seemed that the spam profiles had randomly chosen a
zodiac sign with approximately 8% of profiles falling into each of the zodiac star signs. All
the spam profiles had “IsPrivate” set as false, which coincided mostly with the non-spam
profiles in the random and top 8 datasets.
4.3.1.2 Robustness of features
As the categorical features are simply values of fields, most of them can be easily changed.
The robustness, in this case, mainly comes from if changing a value of a field, and thereby
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value of a feature, would make the spam profile less e"ective (i.e., getting fewer users to click
on a link). As mentioned in Section 4.1, most spam profiles portray young, single women
and present other characteristics that make them more likely to be successful in spamming.
Thus, the features “Age”, “Gender”, and “Status”, would have a high robustness as they
must take on certain values to be e"ective. Examples of low robustness features are “Kid”,
“Smoke”, “Drink”, and “DefaultIM”.
4.3.2 Free-form text features
To convert the free-form text fields into features, we combine all the free-form text fields
and use a bag-of-words approach where each word is treated as a binary feature (present
or not). Before being treated as a feature, each word is stemmed and checked if it is a
stop-word. Porter’s stemming algorithm [80] first reduces the words to their root, e.g.,
“jumping”, “jumper”, and “jumped” are all reduced to their root “jump”. Stop-words are
words commonly used in a natural language and do not contain any significant meaning. We
remove these words as they can confuse classifiers due to their high occurrence. Examples
of stop words are “a”, “the”, and “it”.
We also removed words which had less than 20 occurrences (a tunable threshold) in
the entire dataset, leaving us with 2,289 words and 3,535 words in the random and top 8
datasets respectively.
Not all profiles contained free-form text features because they were blank or private pro-
files, and a few contained unparsable free-form fields. In the random dataset, approximately
9000 non-spam profiles (55%) did not contain any text in the free-form fields; similarly, in
the top 8 dataset, approximately 4300 non-spam profiles (26%) did not contain any text in
the free-form fields. There were 789 spam profiles which did not contain any text in the
free-form fields.
4.3.2.1 Discriminatory power
Once again, we use the !2 test to find the most discriminative features separating the spam
and non-spam classes. Figure 11(b) shows some of the words with the highest and lowest
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discriminatory power using the !2 test. As expected, the words with the highest discrim-
inative power are spammy words because these words likely occur in most spam profile
free-form text but not in legitimate profile free-form text. A few of the non-spam words
that do occur in the most discriminative top 20 words are words used in conjunction with
spammy terms such as [check out my] “picture”, “watch” [pictures/videos], and “heard” [of
a drug].
Although the individual !2 test scores of the most powerful discriminative free-form text
features is lower than the categorical, we have over 2,000 free-form text features present for
each dataset. Some features might be co-dependent, but we assume independence as this a
standard assumption when dealing with text classification.
4.3.2.2 Robustness of features
As previously mentioned, as most of the free-form text features with the highest discrimina-
tory power are spammy words, an adversary could change the free-form text to not include
spam words. This is not very practical as: a) removing spam tokens from the free-form text
fields would make the spam profiles less e"ective, and b) to be most e"ective, the free-form
text fields must be well written, which requires spammers to manually rewrite the text.
Although an adversary might attempt to replace the words with the highest discriminatory
power with a synonym or another form of camouflage (e.g. replacing “click” with “c1ick”),
our detection techniques could similarly be tuned to detect synonyms and adjust for this.
To be conservative, we assign 30% of the most discriminatory words a low robustness, as
even with the low practicality for the adversary, these words are most likely to be changed
first. Words after this are assigned a medium to high robustness.
4.4 Analysis of Classification Results
We separately evaluate the e"ectiveness of using categorical and free-form text features,
followed by an evaluation using a combined classifier. As a baseline, we compare our results
to a basic majority classifier, which on both datasets results in a 90.9% accuracy with an
AUC of 0.499. The majority classifier, which simply classifies all instances as the class
with the most instances, classifies all profiles as non-spam, which results in 1496 (9.1%)
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(b) !2 test for a sample of free-form text features
Figure 11: Discriminatory power of features measured by the !2 test for both categorical







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9 shows the result of classification of social spam profiles on the random and top
8 datasets. Results in bold highlight the best results for a particular classifier and measure
(averaged over both datasets).
4.4.1 Categorical features
We first look at the results of the classifiers that use only the categorical set of features.
Based on Table 9, we see that the J48 classifier performs the best, misclassifying only 79 and
108 profiles (accuracy of 99.6% and 99.4%) on the random and top 8 dataset respectively.
This is followed closely by MLPs. SMO (with PolyKernel) and AdaBoostM1 (with Deci-
sionStumps) perform well in terms of AUC but have a lot of FPs and FNs, comparatively.
J48 performs the best as there are some very discriminatory features, which allow it
to quickly detect “obvious” spam or non-spam in the early levels of the tree, followed by
refinement at the lower levels. As an example, the root of the J48 tree for the random
dataset simply checks if “Smoke” is “undef” and if not, detects the instance as non-spam.
This correctly classifies 78% (11,734 of 15,000) non-spam profiles with an error of less than
1%. For the same reason, we expected AdaBoostM1 (with DecisionStumps) to perform
much better than it did. DecisionStumps are simply single branch trees, and they should
have been able to classify the spam profiles even using only 10 iterations of boosting. In
fact, for the default ROC threshold used by Weka, the AdaBoostM1 (with DecisionStumps)
classifier performs only marginally better than the baseline majority classifier in terms of
the number of misclassified spam profiles on the top 8 dataset.
Most classifiers also tended to perform better on the random dataset than on the top 8
dataset. This can be explained by the profiles in the top 8 dataset being more similar to
the spam profiles (based on the overall lower !2 test score), causing more misclassifications.
On investigating the misclassifications, we found that most of the false-positives were
due to a particular “strain” of spam profiles, which were more complete and contained
legitimate looking categorical features. Additionally, unlike other spam profiles, this strain
seemed to be selling male enhancement drugs, and the profiles were in a relationship. It
is likely that the classifiers attributed the strain of spam profiles as noise and avoided
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over-training.
Empty or partially filled out profiles resulted in a small number of false-negatives for
all the classifiers, followed by additional false-negatives for some classifiers that mistook
partially filled out profiles of young women as spam. Some of the empty profiles were the
result of profiles “Undergoing construction” at the point of crawling.
4.4.2 Free-form text features
We now explore the classification of profiles based on the free-form text-based sections of
their profiles. From Table 9, we see that a näıve Bayes classifier using only free-form text
features does poorly in comparison to the classifiers using only categorical features.
The large number of false-positives were due to 789 of 1496 spam profiles (53%) contain-
ing blank free-form text sections (or the free-form text sections not being parsable), which
resulted in the majority non-spam label applied to such profiles. From a sample of profiles,
we manually investigated and found the false-negatives were mainly due to non-spam pro-
files using spammy tokens in their about me section. For example, we looked at the most
discriminatory spam features in a subset of non-spam profiles used in the random dataset;
we found 47, 36, 457, and 90 occurrences of the spam tokens “click”, “adult”, “sexi”, and
“c**k”, respectively.
4.4.3 Categorical and Free-form text features
A natural question which arises is whether the independent predictions of the classifiers on
the categorical and free-form text features can be combined to improve our classification
results. The aim here would be to use classifiers which are best at classifying their respective
feature set (and allow for co-dependence in the case of free-form text features).
To do this we experimentally examine the results of applying the ‘AND’ and ‘OR’
operators to the predictions of the classification based on the default ROC threshold. When
classifying spam profiles, in the case of the ‘AND’ operator, only if both categorical and
free-form text classifiers predicted the profile to be “spam” will the profile to be marked as
spam. In the case of the ‘OR’ operator, either categorical or free-form text feature classifier
predicting the profile as “spam” will result in the profile being marked as such. To reduce
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the number of false-negatives, we only considered the outcome of the free-form text classifier
if the text feature set was not empty.
Intuitively, the ‘AND’ operator should reduce the number of false-negatives as both
classifiers will have to predict a “spam” classification before one is assigned. The ‘OR’
operator on the other hand should reduce the number of false-positives as either classifier
predicting “spam” will cause “spam” to be assigned. On the flip-side, the ‘AND’ operator
will increase the number of false-positives due to more “spam” being classified as “non-
spam” and similarly the ‘OR’ operator will increase the number of false-negatives.
We do not show results here because, as intuitively explained, applying the above op-
erators to predictions simply reduced either false-negatives or false-positives but not both
simultaneously. We hypothesize that building a new classifier over the combined categorical
and free-form text features would alleviate this problem.
4.5 Analysis of Adversarial Classification Results
Previous evolutionary studies [46, 81] have shown that once techniques are developed to
counter particular types of spam, spammers evolve and deploy new types of spam to bypass
those techniques. Assuming the presence of an adversary with an ability to probe our
classifier for most discriminatory features, we evaluate the e"ectiveness of our classifiers
with the low robustness and high discriminatory power features removed—as adversaries
are likely to remove most spammy easy-to-change (low-impact on spam) features first. To
emulate this, we use the !2 test score of the features over both datasets and remove the
highest discriminatory features with low robustness.
As a baseline, we again use a basic majority classifier, which on both datasets results
in a 90.9% accuracy with an AUC of 0.499. The majority classifier classifies all profiles
as non-spam, which results in 1496 (9.1%) false-positives and 0 false-negatives—the results
remain the same as we do not change the number of profiles, only reduce the set of features.
Table 10 shows the result of classification of social spam profiles, assuming an adversary,
on the random and top 8 datasets. Results in bold highlight the best results for a particular
classifier and measure (averaged over datasets).
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4.5.1 Categorical features
For the categorical set of features, the four features with the strongest discriminatory power
and low robustness are “DefaultIM”, “Smoke”, “Drink”, and “Kid”. Based on Table 10, we
see that the J48 classifier performs the best, misclassifying 1172 and 264 profiles (accuracy
of 92.9% and 98.4%) on the random and top 8 dataset respectively. AdaBoostM1 (with
DecisionStumps) and MLPs, also do well based on the resulting AUC, but AdaBoostM1
(with DecisionStumps) has a significantly higher number of misclassifications. SMO (with
PolyKernel) performs the poorest, with the classification on the random dataset being
similar to that of the baseline majority classifier.
J48 performs the best, for reasons similar to it doing the best at regular classification
as well—it is able to use the highest remaining discriminatory features to detect “obvious”
spam or non-spam in the early levels of the tree. As the most discriminatory features have
been removed, the J48 decision tree resulting from this classification is more complex with
the number of leaves in the tree growing by about 45%. Even with the best classification
results, the J48 classifier misclassifies over 1400 profiles (4.3%) on both advesarial datasets,
as compared to a misclassification of less than 200 profiles (0.6%) on both non-advesarial
datasets. Although the lack of expressiveness of the PolyKernel is the likely reason for SMO
with PolyKernel classifier performing badly on the random dataset, we are investigating this
fruther.
On investigating the misclassifications we found that in addition to the false positives
incurred by the non-adversarial classifier, profiles of women around the age of 30 started
being marked as legitimate. Additional false negatives incurred by the adversarial classifier
were due to partially complete profiles of women which had filled in certain categorical
fields which previously would have identified them as non-spam, but which are no-longer
considered.
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4.5.2 Free-form text features
To pick which free-form text features to remove we averaged the discriminatory power of
the free-form text features between datasets and chose features with the strongest discrimi-
natory power and lowest robustness. We set a limit of disregarding 900 features per dataset,
which left us with 1,389 features and 2,635 features in the random and top 8 datasets re-
spectively. The results of running the classifiers over the new set of features, gives us the
results shown in Table 10.
The näıve Bayes classifier performs similarly over the full feature set. This indicates
that although the features with the strongest discriminatory power were removed, there is
a large enough set of weaker features available for classification.
Once again, a large number of the false positives were due to spam profiles not contain-
ing a free-form text section, and the false negatives due to spammy tokens being used in
legitimate profiles.
4.6 Related Work
Heymann et al. [44] provide an overview of social spam fighting mechanisms, categorizing
them broadly into: Detection-, prevention-, and demotion-based strategies. They group
classification approaches as detection-based strategies, likely due to the fact that previous
work [69, 108] mostly makes use of features which require spammy behavior to be present,
before classification is possible. We focus on a prevention-based strategy using machine
learning, to identify social spam profiles before they can be used to propagate spam.
A lot of work has been done in the area of demotion [or promotion] strategies, namely
trust. TrustRank [42] and SocialTrust [25] look at graph-based techniques to ranking
nodes within a network. SocialTrust looks explicitly at trust in a social network, whereas
TrustRank approaches the problem from a web spam perspective, both of which are mod-
ifications of the PageRank algorithm [79]. A specialized look into the trust of Couch-
Surfing.com and Del.icio.us is done by Lauterbach et al. [63] and Noll et al. [78], which




We explore the limits of classifying social spam profiles on MySpace. Specifically, we focus
on zero-minute fields or static fields present when a profile is created to determine whether
such a technique would be feasible in preventing spammers from gaining a foothold inside a
social network to send spam. We start with an analysis of features that includes a statistical
analysis to determine the discriminatory power of a feature as well as the robustness of
features to adversarial attack. We then measure the e"ectiveness of classifiers that are built
using these features.
Our classification results show that a standard C4.5 decision tree performs the best with
an AUC of 0.994 and an average of approximately 24 false-positives and 70 false-negatives.
The number of false-positives is acceptable as most of the non-spam profiles misclassified
were partially filled out profiles. A subset of the false-positives are a new “strain” of
spam profiles that expose one of the weaknesses of our classification technique—namely, a
weakness in detecting new types of spam profiles without su!cient training examples. To
further explore the potential of new types of spam profiles evading our classifiers, we use
our earlier statistical analysis to disregard features that are most likely to be camouflaged
by an adversary and analyze the e"ects this has on the classifier’s performance.
We believe that the classification results are positive enough to justify building a system
in which a classifier can automatically detect most spam profiles with a high confidence,
and mark others as gray profiles. Collaborative filtering (with a lower threshold) or ad-
ministrator reporting can be used to confirm the correct class label for these gray profiles,
which in turn could be used in a feedback loop to improve future classification results.
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CHAPTER V
DETECTION OF TREND-STUFFING ON TWITTER
Twitter is growing in popularity as a micro-blogging service for users to share a short
message (called a tweet with a maximum length of 140 characters) with friends and others.
It grew to over 7 million unique visitors [72] and 50 million tweets per day [102] in 2009.
Current estimates put Twitter at 20 million unique visitors monthly and over 1.2 billion
tweets a month [5]. Technically, Twitter is a multicast service, where followers subscribe
to postings from users (and topics [91]) of interest. Twitter’s homepage contains listings of
trending topics under the headings of: currently popular, popular this hour, and popular
today, as well as an abbreviated list alongside most user pages. Typically, trending topics
are associated with news related to current events or upcoming events.
Trending topics help users receive the tweets they are interested in, and even allow
visitors to catch up with the latest topics. However, such keywords can also be misused
by spammers and other malicious parties (called miscreants for the lack of a better word)
to promote their own interests, in a practice we call trend stu!ng. Typical scenarios of
misuse are tweets that include an unrelated, but popular trending topic. Such association
can be achieved easily by adding the hashtag—a word or tag prefixed with a ‘#’ character
to identify topics—for a currently popular topic, to the spamming tweet. Unsuspecting
followers of the trending topic will receive the tweet and may then click on the spammers
websites, increasing their tra!c and value. The practice of trend stu!ng is against the rules
outlined in the “Spam and Abuse” section of Twitter’s fair use policy [4] and tools have
been introduced to combat such tweets [3,31], but they have not been able to eliminate this
practice yet. One plausible explanation for this persistence is that trend-stu!ng breaks the
rules and probably results in the suspension or deletion of the o"ending account, but new
accounts can be easily created.
Automated identification of tweets that contain trend-stu!ng is a significant challenge
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due to the small amount of information contained within their 140-character limit. The
first contribution of this chapter is an approach to automatically identify trend-stu!ng in
tweets. We do this in three steps: First, we build a model of tweet content associated to a
trending topic. The goal of this model is to distinguish trend-stu!ng tweets from legitimate
tweets within the limited content information of a tweet. Second, when a tweet contains a
URL, we use the URL to build a meta-model of its web page content. This meta-model is
e"ective since most spam tweets aim to promote a website. Third, we combine the tweet
content model with the web page content meta-model to increase its discriminating power.
The second contribution of the chapter is a quantitative evaluation of the performance
of each model and their combination using a dataset of over 1.3 million tweets collected
between November 2009 and February 2010. This evaluation data set includes the collec-
tion of webpages pointed to by the tweets, consisting of 1.3 million webpages following any
redirect chains that may have been present. In addition, we also verified the longevity of
tweet accounts that sent those tweets. If an account has been suspended, we assume that
it has been classified as spammer or miscreant by Twitter. This information is used to
sharpen our evaluation, for example, to verify if tweets classified as “not belonging to a
trend” are actually trend-stu"ed tweets. When using individual single-trend classifiers, the
C4.5 decision tree classifier achieves the highest average F1-measure of 0.79 on the tweet
text and 0.9 on the associated webpage content. Combining the classification predictions
from the tweet text and the associated webpage content, we find that the C4.5 decision
trees perform the best when combined with the ‘OR’ operator with a 0.9 combined clas-
sification. Combining the classifiers using simple ‘OR’ and ‘AND’ operators, allows us to
take advantage of the performance of the respective classifiers, while “short-circuiting” the
combined classification with a positive or negative prediction respectively.
5.1 Overview of Tweets and Trending Topics
Tweets (or statuses) are short 140 character messages that are posted by users in response
to the question “What are you doing?”. A user’s tweets are delivered to all the friends
following the user, and the tweets are also available on the user’s account. As the evolution
56
of Twitter into an avenue for content-creation has steadily progressed, Twitter has changed
the question posed to users (when posting a message) to “What’s happening?” [91].
Trending topics on Twitter are popular topics that are being tweeted about the most
frequently at a particular point in time. As the question being posed to users is now
“What’s happening?” popular topics are usually associated with current events. In fact,
some trending topics have played a significant role in providing news for breaking stories
and allowing users to provide opinions on current events (e.g., Haiti disaster relief). Twitter
has also used hashtags—a word or tag prefixed with a ‘#’ character—to identify such topics,
although recently the requirement for a ‘#’ before a tag has been dropped. We henceforth
sometimes use trend as a short-form for a trending topic.
5.1.1 Trend Stu!ng
Currently, trending topics are listed on the Twitter homepage as well alongside most other
pages on Twitter. Due to their high visibility, trending topics attract tweets that may not
be directly related to the topic—a practice we call trend stu!ng. These deceptive tweets
may arise from spammers, marketers, or users who want to promote a particular message
(e.g., “Happy Birthday Tim #worldcup”). Twitter’s Rules [4] forbid this behavior, stating
permanent suspension will result from “post[ing] multiple unrelated updates to a trending
or popular topic”.
Twitter has taken steps to reduce the amount of noise in trending topics [3,31], and even
though such measures have had an e"ect on the amount of obvious spam in the trending
topics, it has not eliminated noise or spam completely. The exact details behind these many
of these measures have not been released, but when details have been released, spammers
have found a way around them. For example, to avoid the detection mechanisms that take
into account the history of a user’s tweets, spammers delete historic tweets (having only a
few “non-deleted” tweets at a particular time). We further discuss some details of known
measures used by Twitter in Section 5.5.
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5.2 Tweet Classification
Our approach to trend stu!ng can be split into three main steps. First, we study text-
classification based only on the 140 characters (or less) of the tweet. This would indicate
how well the text of the tweets themselves could be used to build a classification model
for a trend. In addition as we will discuss in Section 5.3, using over 12,000 features for
the classification model is not feasible and thus we needed to take an intermediary step to
reduce the number of features considered for each trend.
Second, we look at text-classification based on webpages associated with a tweet. The
intuition is that the content of the webpages associated with a tweet can also be used to
determine if a tweet belongs to a trend or not. Further, this would likely be e"ective as since
the intent of spammers is to promote a website, most spam tweets would contain a URL.
Once again, the number of website content features is too large (over 500,000) to be feasible
for classification, and thus we take an intermediary step of feature selection, discussed in
Section 5.3, to reduce the number of features considered for each trend.
The third step involves combining the text-classification of both the tweet text and on
the associated webpage content. In this case we compare the performance of using the
‘AND’ and ‘OR’ operator in combining the prediction from the tweet text classifier and
associated webpage content classifier, in determining whether the tweet (and associated
webpage) belong to the trend.
Before discussing the statistical methods used in our study, we describe the dataset used
for our experiments.
5.2.1 Dataset collection
We gathered over 1.3 million tweets related to 2,067 trends over a 3 month period between
November 22, 2009 and February 21, 2010. The top 10 most popular trending topics were
queried every hour using the Twitter API [2], followed by subsequently fetching tweets
associated with the top 10 trends every minute.
We also crawl all webpages linked by a tweet as tweets may contain little or no-text
with only a link promoting a site. In fact, since we are particularly interested in finding
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spammers or users who try to promote sites unrelated to a particular trend, we focus on
tweets that contain links. We follow the link and its corresponding redirection chain to
fetch the final webpage belonging to the link. This collection process generated over 1.3
million webpages, not including intermediate webpages responsible for redirection. Further
details on how we handle redirect chains as well as JavaScript redirection can be found in
our previous work [98].
The average size of a tweet in our dataset is 105 characters, with a standard deviation
of 9 characters. The average size of a webpage linked to by a tweet is 55kB, with a standard
deviation of 41kB. Although there are a number of other characteristics to explore, numerous
papers have already focused on characterizing Twitter [45, 53, 59, 61]. In this chapter, we
focus on the features used in classification and the actual classification itself.
We perform text-classification on both the tweet text and the content of the final web-
page pointed to by the tweet. In both cases, we tokenize the text and use each word as a
feature after performing Porter’s stemming [80], removing stop-words, and removing tokens
with less than 50 occurrences throughout the dataset. The tweet text also undergoes addi-
tional pre-processing to remove any text that is directly associated with the trending topic
(e.g., trend hashtag or words found to be part of the topic). Finally, we count the number
of occurrences of the token and use this count as a numeric feature. After performing these
steps, the tweet text generated over 12,000 features, and the webpage content accounted
for over 520,000 features.
5.2.1.1 Statistical Classification Setup
We use supervised learning because our initial experiments with an unsupervised learning
algorithm (clustering using k-means and EM) generated unsatisfactory results. Specifically,
we found the large number of features, and sometimes irrelevant features, caused the clus-
tering algorithm to perform poorly. On the other hand, the supervised learning algorithms
were able to quickly and accurately identify tweets not belonging to a given trend, even in
the presence of noisy labels.
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We build a classifier model for each of the 670 trends, with over 200 tweets, using one-
to-many classification with all the tweets belonging to the trend in one class and a stratified
sampling of tweets in the other trends (with at minimum one tweet per trend). As an
example, if a particular trend has 500 tweets, we pick 669 tweets from the other trends
resulting in classification for 1169 tweets.
We do not build one single multi-class classifier for multiple reasons: 1) retraining would
be required for new classes (trends) and over time as topic drift occurs; 2) smaller classifiers
would be quicker and more robust; 3) more aggressive feature selection can be performed
to reduce the feature set to only those terms relevant to the particular trend.
As we are using supervised learning, we need to provide labels for training the classifier
(or building the model). We use a label associated with each unique trend text (e.g.,
“welcome 2010” or “tiger woods”) as assigned by Twitter. When assigning labels, we do
not remove tweets from suspended accounts from the dataset because in practice, these
algorithms will be trained on somewhat noisy data as tweets are only identified as “bad”
after a certain time-lag. The classifiers will need to rely on the confidence bounds as well
as cross-validation to only learn features of tweets related to the trend and mis-classify the
noise. Although this decision might result in trends containing a large number of noisy
labels such that the noise is included in the model of tweets belonging to the trend, this
methodology represents a realistic scenario that we wish to analyze.
We use F1-measure to evaluate the performance of our classifiers. In our one-to-many
experimental setup, positive tweets are tweets that belong to a given trend, and negative
tweets are tweets that belong to other trends for the particular experiment. In our eval-
uation, we take into account the number of suspended tweets classified as positive which
were labeled as positive but which should not have been—as mentioned earlier, suspended
tweets are likely to not belong to any trend. Namely, the F1-measure is adjusted by taking






































Figure 12: Percentage of suspended tweets vs number of tweets in a trend
5.2.1.2 Dataset Label Refinement
To identify tweets associated with trend stu!ng, we re-queried the Twitter accounts of
users who had tweets in our dataset to check if their Twitter account had been suspended.
We found over 26,000 Twitter accounts associated with tweets had been suspended (or ap-
proximately 3.5% of all accounts collected), which were responsible for over 130,000 tweets
(or approximately 10% of all tweets collected). We do submit that a very small percentage
of these accounts may have been suspended for purposes other than spam, and in-addition,
there are Twitter accounts which have been used for spam which have not yet been sus-
pended by Twitter. Figure 12 shows the number of tweets in a trend on the x-axis, as well
as the percentage of tweets in a trend which come from suspended accounts on the y-axis.
Each point represents a unique trend.
5.3 Reduction of Feature Sets
Classification with over 12,000 features for the tweet text and over 520,000 features for
webpage content is not practical. Most classifiers will perform poorly either due to the
curse of dimensionality [21] or due to the computational burden of trying to analyze patterns
associated with all the features (e.g., in Neural Networks learning weights for thousands of
input nodes).
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We chose Information Gain to reduce the number of features to a tractable size. In-
formation Gain, from an information theory perspective, is a measure of the amount of
expected reduction in entropy if one were to use the feature to partition tweets belonging to
a trend, from tweets not belonging in a trend. After calculating the amount of Information
Gain for each feature, we pick the strongest features.
Previous work on a study of feature selection in text categorization [104] found that
Information Gain was e"ective in drastically reducing (by up to 98%) the number of features
used for classification while not losing categorization accuracy. As we plan to do the feature
selection for each trend when performing one-to-many classification, we believe an even
more drastic reduction can be preformed.
We decided to evaluate our classification with a more tractable set of 100 and 1000
features for the tweet text—0.8% and 8% of the total number of tweet text features,
respectively—and with a set of 100, 1000, and 5000 features for the webpage content—
0.02%, 0.2% and 1% of the total number of webpage content features, respectively. Table 11
shows the average lowest Information Gain and the average total Information Gain. The
average lowest Information Gain is the average Information Gain of the weakest feature in
the feature set—it indicates that any features not added into the set will have an Infor-
mation Gain value lower than it. The average total Information Gain can intuitively be
thought of as the average total discriminative power of all the features used to distinguish
the trend from others.
For the tweet text from the Table 11(a), we see that after 100 features, the average
Information Gain of the weakest feature drops to 0.004, which is indicative of most of the
discriminative power being captured in the first 100 features. This is further shown in Ta-
ble 11(b), where the average total Information Gain increases by only 0.4 when considering
an additional 900 tweet text features. In fact, we find that on average, after 317 features
the Information Gain drops to zero. For evaluation purposes, we still consider tweet text
classification both using 100 and 1000 features.
For the webpage content from Table 11(a), the average Information Gain of the weakest
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Table 11: Comparison of the number of features considered, when using Information Gain
to reduce the feature set size.




Tweet Text 0.004 $ 0 -
Webpage Content 0.096 0.016 0.002




Tweet Text 2.1 2.5 -
Webpage Content 14.6 46.9 70.9
feature when considering 100, 1000, and 5000 features, is 0.096 to 0.016 to 0.002, respec-
tively. Considering the average total Information Gain shown in Table 11(b), we see a
300% increase from 100 to 1000 features, and a further 50% increase from 1000 to 5000 fea-
tures. The large increase in entropy when considering webpage content features, especially
as large as when going from 100 to 1000 features, makes it likely that using 100 features for
classification for webpage content may not be enough. We will evaluate webpage content
classification using 100, 1000, and 5000 features.
5.4 Experimental Classification Results
We separately evaluate the e"ectiveness of classification on the tweet text and the webpage
content, followed by an evaluation combining the predictions of both classifiers. As pre-
viously mentioned, we use tweets from suspended accounts to validate the false-negatives.
Validating the true-positives requires a larger manual e"ort and we explore this for a subset
of tweets in Section 5.4.4.
As a baseline for our classification results we use the majority classifier which classifies
all profiles into the larger class. The class representing a sample of all tweets except tweets
näıvely classified into the trend, has the same size as the opposing class, so both classes have
an equal size. The majority classifier would have a 50% accuracy with a F1-measure of 0.66
(assuming the positive class is assigned the majority class) or 0 (assuming all tweets are
majority classified into the negative class)—for our purposes we use a baseline F1-measure
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of 0.66.
5.4.1 Classification using Tweet Text
We first look at the results of the classifiers that use only features based on tokens in the
tweet text. The results of classification using these features is shown in Figure 13. Each set
of bars represents a di"erent classifier, and each bar within the set represents the average
performance in terms of F1-measure on a di"erent number of features. We see that näıve
Bayes and C4.5 decision trees perform well, with C4.5 decision trees performing the best by
a small margin. Decision Stumps on the other hand perform on quite poorly, worse than
the baseline majority classifier.
C4.5 decision trees and näıve Bayes have the highest F1-measure as they have a lower
number of false-negatives, or tweets classified as not being in the trend. Decision Stumps
are only able to use a single feature to decide if a tweet is in the trend or not and thus in the
absence of a “hashtag” is not able to perform very well. The poor performance of Decision
Stumps was due to the low expressive power of a single Decision Stump and lack of a single
feature that could, without noise, capture the essence of a trend. Compared to a sample of
C4.5 decision trees, we found the root node to be the same, but the C4.5 decision tree had
a number of branches under the root to filter out false-positives and false-negatives.
Figure 14 shows the F1-measure results of näıve Bayes classification, using 100 features.
The number of tweets belonging to the trend being classified (the positive class) is shown
on the x-axis with the F1-measure on the y-axis. We see that as the number of tweets in
the positive class increases, the amount of variation in the F1-measure reduces significantly
with the scores tending to be higher. The reason for this is, especially for smaller trends,
some of the positive classes may contain a large percentage of noise (suspended tweets).
If this is the case, the classifier learns the noise as part of the trend. In calculating the
F1-measure, as we consider suspended tweets not part of the trend, this can reduce the
resulting F1-measure. As the number of tweets in the positive class increases, the likelihood
of noisy tweets being classified as part of the trend decreases, and thus results in fewer false-






















Figure 13: Results of classification on tweet text using di"erent number of features. Error-
bars represent one standard-deviation of the F1-measure.
as positive). The reason for the small di"erence between the classification using 100 features
and 1000 features of tweet text, is likely due to the Information Gain per feature being very
low after selecting the strongest 100 features (in some cases even zero).
One of the other important factors in performance of a classifier is the amount of time
it takes to build the model and time to classify a tweet. Table 12 shows the result of the
average model build time (training time) and average classification time (test time) for a
single tweet for both 100 and 1000 features, using di"erent classifiers. We see that Decision
Stumps take the least time for both building the model and to classify a tweet, but this is
due to the very simplistic single branch model. Näıve Bayes is faster at building a model
than C4.5 Decision Trees as in näıve Bayes, each feature is treated independently and thus
can be looked at once, whereas in when building a C4.5 decision tree, at every node, an
attribute is picked based on the highest Information Gain of available features, followed by
a recursion on the smaller sublists. C4.5 decisions trees are much faster than näıve Bayes
on classifying a tweet once the model is built as a relatively small decision tree needs to
be traversed to determine a label for the tweet, rather than näıve Bayes which needs to
calculate the combined sum of probabilities for all the features. Näıve Bayes requiring to
find the combined sum of probabilities, is the reason there is an over 400% increase in time

















Figure 14: F-measure of näıve Bayes classifier using 100 tweet text features.
Table 12: Average time in ms, to train and test the classifiers over the tweet text.
Tweet text Number of features
Training Time (ms) 100 1000
Näıve Bayes 0.21 0.79
C4.5 Decision Tree 0.77 7.80
DecisionStump 0.22 0.86
Test Time (ms) 100 1000
Näıve Bayes 0.26 1.12
C4.5 Decision Tree 0.08 0.11
DecisionStump 0.07 0.11
5.4.2 Classification using Webpage Content
We now explore the classification of tweets based on the text-features from the webpage
content associated with the tweets. Webpage content associated to tweets should also be
related to the trend or be separable in such a way. The results of classification using these
features is shown in Figure 15. Similar to Figure 13, each set of bars represents a di"erent
classifier, and each bar within a set represents the average performance in terms of F1-
measure using a di"erent number of features. The C4.5 decision trees perform the best,
followed closely by Decision Stumps. Näıve Bayes performs the worst, but better than a
baseline classifier.
C4.5 decision trees perform the best as they have the least false-negatives, followed by
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the Decision Stump classifier. The tree-based classifiers (C4.5 decision trees and Decision
Stump) perform well in this case as there are a few strong features which distinguish the
trends. The explanation for this is that webpages related to the trend contained words
strongly related to the topic, i.e. for the hashtag “#helphaiti”, the strongest features were
“haiti”, “earthquake”, “donate”, “disaster”, and “relief”. The Decision Stump, due to the
single level tree, cannot reduce the number of false-positives using further decisions.
Figure 16 shows the F1-measure results of using the C4.5 decision tree classifier with
100 features on the webpage content. The number of webpages belonging to the trend being
classified (the positive class) is shown on the x-axis with the F1-measure on the y-axis. Once
again, the reason for the variance reducing and the increased F1-measure as the number
of positive webpages linked, is that the percentage of suspended tweets which make up a
trend as the trend size increases, decreases and this causes the classifier to be less likely to
learn the suspended tweets as part of the trend.
We also look at the time (ms) taken to build the classification models and to classify
individual webpages. Table 13 shows the average time to build the model (training time)
and time to classify (test time) a single webpage using di"erent classifiers and number of
features. We see that the training time for näıve Bayes and Decision Stumps are the lowest,
and C4.5 decision trees taking the longest time. In terms of classifying a webpage once
a model is built, both C4.5 decision trees and Decision Stumps are the fastest, while the
näıve Bayes is relatively slow. The time the näıve Bayes takes to classify a single webpage
associated with a tweet increases by over 600% when increasing the number of features from
1000 to 5000 features.
5.4.3 Classification using Tweet Text and Webpage Content combined
After studying the performance of the classifiers on the individual sets of features, a natural
next step is to combine the predictions from the classifiers of the tweets and associated
webpages to a combined prediction. There are two main reasons for doing so:
1. Tweets might not contain enough text to make an accurate classification all the time.


















Figure 15: Results of classification on webpage content using di"erent number of features.
Error-bars represent one standard-deviation of the F1-measure.
Table 13: Average time in ms, to train and test the classifiers over the webpage content.
Webpage content Number of features
Training Time (ms) 100 1000 5000
Näıve Bayes 0.17 1.19 7.06
C4.5 Decision Tree 0.62 9.46 -
DecisionStump 0.17 1.25 7.53
Test Time (ms) 100 1000 5000
Näıve Bayes 0.17 0.90 5.96
C4.5 Decision Tree 0.05 0.11 -
DecisionStump 0.05 0.13 0.39
this case, classifying the webpage content associated with the tweet might help make
an accurate classification on whether or not the tweet actually does belong to the
trend.
2. It might be easy for a spammer to camouflage a tweet to look like it belongs to a
trend, but it would take more e"ort (on the part of the spammer) to also camouflage
the webpage linked in the tweet to look like it belonged to the trend. Even if the
spammer were to do so, they would have to customize their webpage for each trend
that they wish to spam, and this would likely be prohibitive.
We compare two methods of combining the classification results from tweets and from
the associated webpages, outlining possible improvements to this method in Section 5.4.5.

















Figure 16: F-measure of C4.5 decision tree classifier using 100 webpage content features.
agree or disagree, and in the case of combining classification results, we will use these to
check if the prediction over a tweet matches the prediction over the associated webpage
content. In the case of the ‘AND’ operator, we will mark a tweet as belonging to a trend,
if the prediction for the tweet ‘AND’ the prediction for the webpage associated with the
tweet both predict that the tweet belongs to the trend. In the case of the ‘OR’ operator, we
will mark a tweet as belonging to a trend, if either prediction for the tweet ‘OR’ prediction
for the webpage associated with the tweet predict that the tweet belongs to the trend.
Intuitively, by using the ‘AND’ operator, we ensure that both predictions on text and
associated webpage agree to classify it in the trend, causing an increase in the number of
false-negatives and true-negatives. On the other hand, the ‘OR’ operator, will cause an
increase in the number of true-positives and false-positives.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the results based on combined classification using the
‘OR’ operator and ‘AND’ operator, respectively. The x-axis displays the classifier used for
the tweet text, whereas each bar within a cluster denotes a classifier used to predict the
label for the associated trend. All classifiers were trained and tested using 100 features. The
y-axis shows the value of the F1-measure achieved by a combined tweet text and webpage
content classifier.
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We find that the combined classifier using the ‘OR’ operator performs better on average
than the combined classifier using the ‘AND’ operator. This as previously mentioned in the
intuition, is due to the ‘OR’ operator leading to more true-positives and perhaps even a few
more false-positives, to the point of performing better than the best individual 100 feature
classifier used. One of the possible reasons for not achieving results closer to 1, is likely due
to trends which are largely made up of suspended tweets. We are currently investigating
this further.
In the case of combining classifiers using the “AND” and “OR” operator, both classifiers
would have to be trained on the trend, and at least one of them would have to be probed at
the time of making the determination of whether the tweet and associated webpage belong
to the trend. This is similar to the common practice of short-circuiting boolean expressions.
In the case of an “AND” operator, a single negative prediction will result in the final label
being negative, whereas in the case of the “OR” operator, a single positive prediction will
result in the final label being positive. In respect to the tweets, the tweet text would
be easier to get a classification label for, especially since obtaining a classification for the
webpage would involve fetching the destination webpage followed by tokenizing and feature
reduction of all the webpage content. Thus the minimum required time to classify a tweet
using the combined approach is the time taken to classify the tweet text, plus an estimated
1
2 of the time taken to classify the webpage content (not taking into account time to fetch,
tokenize, and reduce features).
5.4.4 Manual Verification of a Subset of Results
In our manual vetting of the results we reviewed a few hundred tweets and associated
webpages. We make a number of interesting observations based on what we found:
1. “Camouflage tweets”. Such spammy tweets had legitimate looking tweet text, but the
link pointed to a webpage which was unrelated to a trend. An example of this is the
tweet “NFL Sunday Night Betting Preview - Brett Favre vs. Kurt Warner (maybe)
[URL removed]” which although related to the trend “NFL”, linked to webpage con-
tent for the dating site “Friend Jungle”.
70
2. Many of the false-negatives were tweets properly classified as not belonging to the
trend. The reason they were counted as false-negatives is that they belonged to
Twitter accounts not yet suspended. For example the tweet “My Top 3 Weekly - Play
Free Online Games [URL removed]” and associated webpage were both classified as
not belonging to the “My Top 3 Weekly” trend, but the Twitter account associated
with this tweet had not been suspended.
3. Some false-positives belonged to the trend they were tweeted in, but were still sus-
pended. These were actually tweets and webpages to legitimate content related
to a topic, but often with inappropriate or obscene language. An example is the
tweet “Check this - Nicole Parker-Best of Britney Spears Part 2 [URL removed] Plz
ReTweet! #musicmonday” related to the trend “#musicmonday”, which links to
parody video on Britney Spears. It is likely that the account posting this tweet got
suspended for the sexually suggestive content of the parody.
5.4.5 Discussion
C4.5 decision trees perform the best and would likely be resilient to a certain amount of
adversarial interference, but the time taken to build a model for a C4.5 decision tree is a
hindering factor in using such classifiers. The Decision Stump classifier performs quite well
and can be trained very quickly, although can be easily overcome by adversaries. Näıve
Bayes although the most robust, takes the longest on classifying each tweet. An advantage
of the näıve Bayes classifier is its suitability for online-learning, namely, being updated
based on user feedback without a large re-training time. Therefore we believe that using
näıve Bayes with a 100 features, or perhaps less depending on the maturity of the trend,
would be ideal in classifying tweets and their associated webpages. We plan on studying
the applicability of using varying feature set sizes, based on the number of tweets belonging
to a trend and the e"ect of classifying recurring or multi-day trends.
Working with a 140 characters of text or less, has been both beneficial and challenging in
that we find that for a particular trend, usually a small selection of features are adequate in


















Figure 17: Results of F1-measure based on prediction from tweet text and webpage content

















Figure 18: Results of F1-measure based on prediction from tweet text and webpage content
classifier combined using the ‘AND’ operator.
is that as tweets contain pointers to allow gathering of further information, it is very easy
for a spammer or a miscreant to camouflage the tweet—make the tweet text look legitimate
while making the link point to a spammy webpage. It is due to this that we also crawl
webpages associated with tweets and use such content in our classification.
5.5 Related Work
Twitter has largely been studied for its network characteristics and structure. The largest
such measure to date has been done by Kwak et al. [61] who study over 106 million tweets
and 41.7 million user profiles. They investigate network characteristics ranging from basic
follower/following relationships to homophily (tendency for similar people to associate with
one-another) to pagerank. They also study trends in relation to the similarity to topics on

















Figure 19: F-measure of combined classifier using näıve Bayes with 100 features on the
tweet-text and C4.5 with 100 webpage content features.
et al. [45] and Krishnamurthy et al. [59] also study the characteristics of Twitter, with
the latter identifying users, their behaviors as well as geographic growth patterns. Java et
al. [53] did an earlier study on the Twitter network a year after its growth and used the
network structure to categorize users into three main categories: information source; friends;
and, information seeker. Information sources they note, were “found to be automated tools
posting news and other useful information on Twitter”.
In terms of spam detection on Twitter, Yardi et al. [105] looked at the life-cycle and
evolution of a trend, with focus on spam. Although they do identify some behavioral
characteristics that can be used to identify spammers, they do conceded that such behavioral
patterns do come with their false-positives. We plan to investigate if we could combine such
techniques to come up with a robust technique to keep spam messages out of trending topics.
Other attempts at spam detection on Twitter include, Spamdetector [94], which is a tool to
apply “some heuristics to detect spam accounts”. Details on this project are unavailable,
but their e"ort is continuing based on users’ feedback to bots on Twitter.
Twitter themselves have taken a proactive approach to detecting spam on their network.
In as early as July 2008 [89] and August 2008 [90], Twitter acknowledged an online battle
with spammers and seemed to respond with placing limits on followers and delete spam
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accounts by using the “number of users who blocked a user” as feedback. Further steps
were taken in November 2009 [31] and in March 2010 [43], first in relation to reducing the
amount of clutter posted to trends (although details on their approach are limited), and
second in relation to introducing a URL filter for protecting against phishing scams.
There has been a lot of related work [86] on using text-based classification on e-mails to
classify them as spam and non-spam. Such techniques could be directly applied to Twitter,
but due to the short messages and camouflage to get users to click links in such posts,
we believe that such techniques would have limited success. Our previous work [49] on
classification of social profiles in MySpace is a precursor to this work, as that looks at zero-
minute classification of social profiles using static profile information. Due to the limited
information that Twitter gathers from a user during account creation, the previous work
would likely need to be applied in conjunction with other techniques, such as the one being
proposed in this chapter, to increase accuracy.
5.6 Conclusion
We research the non-trivial problem of text classification in a restricted environment of
only 140 characters, such as that presented by trend stu!ng on Twitter. Our approach to
the problem included first modeling tweets that belong to a trend using text-classification
on the text of the tweet itself. We followed this with building a meta-model for webpages
linked in tweets that belong to a trend. Finally, we combined both the tweet text model and
the webpage content model to increase the performance in classifying tweets that belong
to trends. In each of the steps, we use additional information about suspended tweets to
validate our results. To make text-classification on the tweet text and the webpage content
feasible, we first used Information Gain to reduce the number of features from over 12,000
and over 500,000, to less than 1,000 features and less than 5,000 features respectively. For
tweet text features and the webpage content features, this accounted for a reduction of over
91% and 99% respectively. We found that even with reductions this large, the Information
Gain of additional features to be on the order of a thousandth of a bit.
C4.5 decision trees achieve the highest F1-measure on both the classification of tweet text
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and associated webpage content, resulting in an F1-measure of 0.79 and 0.9 respectively.
Näıve Bayes performs well on the tweet text with a result of 0.77 and not very well on
the webpage content. On the other hand, Decision Stumps perform well on the webpage
content with an F1-measure of 0.81 and not very well on the tweet text. We find by
combining predictions from classifiers on the two sets of features, we perform well on most
combinations of classifiers in the case of the ‘OR’ operator. In most cases, we do not find a
significant di"erence between classification using 100 features and over a 1000 features. In
addition we also compare the time taken to build a classification model and to test tweets
or webpages against each classifier. We find that C4.5 decision trees take the longest to
build a classification model, but are very quick at testing an instance. Näıve Bayes takes a
much shorter time to build a classification model, but takes longer at testing each instance.
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PREVENTING ABUSE OF ONLINE COMMUNITIES
PART II





Social networking sites are big. MySpace and Facebook both have over 250,000,000 ac-
counts [14, 73] and are still growing at a rapid pace [28]. As a social network gets larger,
they attract more users and share even more information.
Unfortunately, threats of private information leakage increase along with the growth of
social networks. As a prerequisite for participating in most social networking sites, a user
has to create a profile, enter some basic information, and is encouraged to enter detailed
information relating to the purpose of the site. For example, Last.fm is a music streaming
service, and it encourages users to enter details about their favorite artists. Due to the large
number of social networking sites currently out there and the increasingly social nature of
the Web, most users belong to more than one social networking site. These users assume
that the information provided will be kept within the boundaries of the social networking
site and that the privacy policies across sites are standard.
The danger of this implicit assumption is that many users do not realize how much
information could be revealed by blurring the boundaries of these social networking sites.
One danger in blurring these boundaries is that any information disclosed at one site could
be combined with information at other social networking sites. We refer to the resulting
combination of the information revealed by multiple social networking sites as a user’s online
social footprint.
We study the threats associated with an online social footprint by leveraging data col-
lected from an online-identity management site. Online-identity management sites allow a
user to provide links to all their social network profiles. We crawled one such site, retriev-
ing over 13,990 profiles and 80,357 potential links to social network profiles. We use this
data to preform quantitative measures with respect to the size of a person’s online social
footprint and the ability of an attacker to reconstruct such a footprint (without the aid of
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an online-identity management site).
In this chapter, we make two main contributions:
• Measure the size of a user’s online social footprint - We find that an active user has
an average of 5.7 profiles, and 28% of those profiles profiles are in the top 15 social
networking sites. Based on a sample of 9 personal information fields, we find that
a person’s online social footprint size increases from an average of 4.3 fields to 8.25
fields when the number of profiles in a person’s online social footprint increases from
1 to 8 profiles.
• Investigate how easy it is to reconstruct a user’s online social footprint - We show that
an attack on targeted individuals is possible without having to use network based de-
anonymization techniques [76,77]. First, assuming an attacker has prior knowledge of
a single pseudonym, we measure the number of other social networking sites he can
find. Our results show that an attacker would be able to find over 40% of a person’s
other social networking sites for most of the dataset in the best case (assuming the
attacker knows the most-common pseudonym). Next, we assumed an attacker knows
the person’s name. In this case, the attacker will try and guess a person’s pseudonym,
and based on our data, he is able to find approximately 10-35% of a person’s other
social networking sites. Although this method might yield a few false-positives, we
evaluate a technique which could be used to calculate the likelihood of two profiles
belonging to the same user.
We expect that our findings will increase the awareness of the threat caused by large
online social footprints and promote protection mechanisms against this threat.
6.1 Background
6.1.1 Online Social Footprints
A user’s online social footprint is the online information that is available about him by
aggregating his social networking profiles. Essentially, this footprint characterizes a user’s
social networking activities. To illustrate, Figure 20 shows a user named Bob Smith and his
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Figure 20: Online Social Footprint
online social footprint, which was constructed with information from three social networking
sites (identified by two unique pseudonyms). Individually, each of these sites reveals between
4 and 6 pieces of information (e.g., age, sex, etc.); however, if the sites are linked together,
8 pieces of information are displayed about Bob. This combined view of Bob’s information
represents his online social footprint.
6.1.2 Threats of Information Leakage
Threats associated with Information Leakage have been discussed in previous research [41,
55], but we briefly describe them here for completeness.
• Online stalking - As users spend more time online and reveal more information about
their activities, they become more susceptible to digital stalking. Using Twitter,
stalkers can view “tweets” about their victims’ current activities. On Last.Fm, stalkers
can determine what music their victims are listening to. Utilizing Del.icio.us, stalkers
can identify the surfing habits of their victims.
• Compromising personal accounts - Most login-based Web sites allow users to “recover”
their passwords by answering some personal questions about themselves. Answers
to common questions such as date of birth, address, or hometown are sometimes
inadvertently made public on social networking sites. A recent example of this type
of compromise occurred when Sarah Palin’s e-mail account was hijacked because the
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recovery question for her Yahoo account was discovered.
• Customized spam/phishing - Occurrences of spear spam/phishing have already been
observed, and with an abundance of personal information, such techniques can be
made more e"ective to the point where the user might be fooled into believing that
the email is legitimate due to the amount of personalized information it contains.
6.2 Online Identities and Data Collection
Identity management sites allow users to manage their online identities by enabling them to
provide links to their social networking sites. One can use an online identity to determine
a user’s social footprint by visiting each profile that is associated with the online identity
and identifying the pieces of information that are revealed by each profile.
In August 2008, we crawled the publicly available online identities stored by one such
identity management site. During this crawl, we collected 54,600 users’ online identities,
and of those identities, 13,990 were labeled active (i.e., the identity contained one or more
links to a profile on a social networking site). From the 13,990 active identities, we found
80,357 links to social networking profiles. Then, we identified links pointing to the top
15 most common social networking sites, which accounted for 21,764 profile links. Next,
we proceeded to crawl the profiles associated with each of these links, obtaining a total of
21,764 profiles. The distribution of the number of profiles crawled for each site is shown in
Table 14.
The profiles and links were entered manually by the users of the identity management
site. However, some of the links were not associated with the user entering the data. For
example, a number of the links pointed to profiles belonging to the users’ friends or celebri-
ties. In a few extreme cases, the links formed a link farm that was used to promote other
sites/profiles. To minimize the e"ect of these links and maintain an accurate representa-
tion of a person’s online identity, we removed these unrelated links by implementing a few
heuristics. For example, we removed any links that were duplicated across profiles because
we had no way of knowing which profile was the legitimate owner of those links.
79
Table 14: Number of profile links.
















To investigate the amount of information leaked by this dataset, we wrote parsers for 101
of the top 15 social networking sites. The parsers performed a great deal of post-processing
to merge fields with semantically similar meanings but syntactic di"erences. An example of
this is “Age” and “Date of Birth”, as Age can be represented as a coarse granularity date
of birth.
Table 15 shows the amount of information parsed from each profile for a small subset
of available fields. For each field, we represent the amount of information as a percentage
of the number of profiles that displayed this value on a particular social networking site. If
a ‘-’ is present, it means the field was not revealed by the site in question.
6.3 Size of a user’s online social footprint
From the data we collected, the number of users with profiles on multiple social networking
sites follows a Zipfian distribution as shown in Figure 21. The number of users exponentially
decreases with an increase in the number of profiles (e.g., we have 5,797 users with one profile
link and 327 users with 10 profile links). We observe a similar trend with the top 15 social
network profile links (e.g., we have 3,335 users with one top 15 profile link and 40 users
1A few sites were not parsed due to technical and legal challenges associated with parsing the site or the















Number of profile links
All links
Top 15 social sites
~ 1/x
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Figure 21: Number of users against size of social network footprint
with 10 top 15 profile links). On average, a user has 5.7 links to other sites, and an average
of 1.6 of those links point to a social network in the top 15. Users with a link to the top 15
social profiles have an average of 2.6 profiles.
Looking at 9 basic fields, a subset of which are shown in Table 15, we measure the size
of an online social footprint. For a user with one social networking site, the online social
footprint size is 4.3 fields on-average, whereas the online social footprint size is over 8.25
fields, on-average, for a person with 8 or more social networking sites. Figure 22 shows
the size of a user’s online social footprint growing, with an increase in the number of social
networking sites.
Depending on the social network being used, the information can vary widely. For
example: Delicious tracks a user’s favorite URLs; Flickr stores user’s pictures, and Last.Fm
tracks the music a user is listening to. We see that sites like Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube






































































































































































































































Number of social networking sites
Figure 22: Average size of an online social footprint increasing with number of social
network sites
6.4 Reconstructing a person’s online social footprint
Each social networking site reveals a limited, sometimes unique, amount of information
about a given user, but if an attacker coalesced the information from multiple social net-
working profiles for that user, the amount of disclosed information would increase signifi-
cantly. In this section, we explore the feasibility of profile aggregation techniques that can
be performed by attackers.
Previous work on aggregation techniques (or de-anonymization techniques) [76,77] have
focused primarily on network based matching techniques. Unfortunately, these approaches
typically require knowledge of a large portion of a social network graph with overlapping
sections, which is very computationally expensive and often impossible to obtain. Thus, to
avoid these issues with previous techniques, we propose using pseudonyms to match profiles
across multiple social networking sites.
6.4.1 Prior knowledge of pseudonyms
Our first aggregation technique assumes that an attacker knows one of a user’s pseudonyms
from an e-mail address or another source. Using a known pseudonym, we investigate what
percentage of a user’s social networking sites can be found by an attacker. In the best-case
(from an attacker’s standpoint), the known pseudonym is the most frequently used by a
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user, and as a result, it allows the attacker to access a maximum number of the user’s social
networking sites. On the other hand, the known pseudonym could be the least frequently
used by a user, revealing a minimum number of the user’s sites (this represents the worst-
case).
Figure 23 illustrates the success rate of this approach by an attacker. The x-axis shows
the number of unique id’s for a user, and the y-axis shows the percentage of the user’s total
number of sites that an attacker can find. For users with two unique pseudonyms, the figure
shows that an attacker can obtain 62% of their social networking sites in the best-case (i.e.,
with knowledge of a user’s most frequently used pseudonym) and 38% of their sites in the
worst-case (i.e., with knowledge of a user’s least frequently used pseudonym). Over 98% of
the users in our dataset have 4 or less unique pseudonyms. Thus, an important observation
from the figure is that an attacker can find more than 40% of those users’ social networking
profiles in the best-case. Even in the worst-case, an attacker can still find over 17% of those
profiles.
Although the figure only illustrates the situation in which an attacker knows a single
pseudonym, we also investigated scenarios in which an attacker knows two or more of a
user’s pseudonyms. As expected, the success rate for these attacks increases dramatically.
With knowledge of only two of a user’s pseudonyms, an attacker will find over 60% of the
user’s social networking profiles in the best-case (and more than 35% of the profiles in the
worst-case).
6.4.2 Inferring a pseudonym from a name
Another method of aggregating a user’s profiles involves guessing that user’s pseudonyms
based on real name information. This method has not been su!ciently explored in previous
literature, and in this section, we investigate the technique’s ability to match a user’s profiles.
To perform the aggregation process, we use three categories of inference rules. To achieve
a baseline result, the inference rules are intentionally simplistic, and each category is limited
to approximately 30 rules. The three categories are as follows:
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Figure 23: Number of sites identified with a single pseudonym in the best-case and worst-
case.
name and last name. This category also includes tests that incorporate a subset of the
first name and/or last name. Examples of guesses include “{FirstName}{Separation-
Character}{LastName}”, “{FirstName}{LastInitial}”, and “{FirstNameSubstr(3)}{LastName}”
(where Separation-Character is one of [-,,̇ .+,]).
2. First name - includes guesses of a pseudonym that include the first name or a substring
of the first name. Examples of guesses include “{FirstName}”, “{FirstNameSubstr(3)}”,
“{FirstName}007/69”, etc.
3. Last name - includes guesses of a pseudonym that include the last name or a substring
of the last name. Examples of guesses include “{LastName}”, “{LastNameSubstr(3)}”,
“{LastName}007/69”, etc.
To illustrate the power of pseudonym guessing, we begin by guessing a user’s pseudonym
in each of the top 15 social networking sites. Figure 24 shows a stacked bar graph that
illustrates the number of pseudonym matches found for each site using each of the inference
rule categories. Each bar consists of three sub-components (one sub-component for each
category). The figure shows that LinkedIn has the highest number of matches for our guess-




























































Number of Unique IDs
Figure 25: Number of sites identified per pseudonym using names as guesses.
as Blogspot, LiveJournal, and Wordpress have a lower than average matching percentage.
One hypothesis for this result is that most people name their blogs about the topic they
plan to write about (i.e., they do not use their real name to title their blogs).
Another important observation from Figure 24 is that a large percentage of the matches
appear in the “First and last name” category. In fact, over 50% of the overall matches
resulted from one of this category’s inference rules: {FirstName} {LastName}. Additionally,
14% of these matches were found on LinkedIn.
Using only the simple guesses described above, we also investigated the percentage of
a user’s profiles that can be found using guess-based aggregation. Figure 25 shows the
percentage of a user’s profiles that were found using this guessing approach. From the
86
figure, we see that even with limited guesses, an attacker can find up to 35% of a user’s
social networking sites (if a user only has one unique pseudonym). Additionally, for users
with six or seven unique pseudonyms, attackers are still about to find around 10% of their
sites.
Although we used relatively simple matching criteria, two profiles with identical pseudonyms
might not belong to the same user (i.e., we might have a false positive). This problem is
exacerbated if one were to guess pseudonyms more aggressively. As the aggressiveness of
the guesses increases, the number of false positives increases as well. To truly estimate the
false positive rate for our guesses, we would need to check if the pseudonym existed on the
respective social networking sites for every one of the generated guesses. This would be
expensive both computationally and in terms of network bandwidth. To overcome these
limitations, we introduce a method in the next section that allows us to gain confidence
about whether or not two profiles are the same by comparing information within the profiles.
6.4.3 Matching profile information
In this section, we o"er an approach for determining if two profiles belong to the same user.
This technique can be used in multiple ways including matching profiles together in the case
when there are no pseudonyms (or pseudonyms are hidden, as is the case with Facebook)
as well as eliminating false-positives.
To check if two profiles belong to the same user we need to check if fields common to both
profiles are equal or similar in value. In this section, we focus our attention on categorical or
single text fields (e.g., “First name”, “Hometown”, etc.) and leave investigating similarity
across free text entry fields (e.g., “About me”, “Interests”, etc.) as future work.
In our dataset, for profiles that have duplicate fields, we investigate the consistency of





, where n is the number of values a field takes on within a profile and
across the dataset respectively) and checking if the values are equal.
Figure 26 shows the amount of consistency between fields within a profile and across































Figure 26: Consistency of fields within a profile and across the entire dataset.
predict two matching profiles. From the figure, we observe that “Sex” is the field with
the highest consistency across profiles; however, this field is not a strong signal because
the consistency of “Sex” against the dataset is very high. As a result, “Sex” is not a
very discriminatory field. Last name, birth year and country all seem to be strong signals
with higher than average matching ability within profiles and low matching ability across
the dataset. Therefore, any of these fields should be a good candidate for checking if two
profiles belong to the same user.
The consistency of certain fields like Martial status and Country could be improved by
cleaning up the data and assigning synonyms to certain values. For example, one social
network site might not distinguish between “Marriage” and “Common-law” whereas another
site might allow the user the option to do so. The value in this case is not inconsistent; it is
simply semantically di"erent. Similarly, more complex location-based fields such as Street,
State or City could be improved by taking into account di"erent ways of representing the
same value, (e.g., a state Georgia could be represented in one social network as Georgia and
as GA in another). Ideally, one would simply be able to feed two locations into a mapping
service and find the distance between the two locations, applying a radius threshold to the
value to determine if they are in the same locality.
Instead of assigning a simple binary value (i.e., consistent or not) to particular field
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matches, a more flexible approach involves assigning a consistency probability based on a
measure of “how far” one value is from another. For numeric fields, a simple measure of how
close the two numbers are divided by the standard deviation can be used as a measure of how
similar two fields are. For textual fields, string similarity metrics (e.g., Cosine similarity,
QGramsDistance, etc.) can be applied.
To illustrate the value of this approach, consider the “Birth Year” field. It is consistent
75% of the time within profiles and only consistent 4% of the times across the dataset. As
a result, this field is a good choice for matching between profiles. Given two profiles that
possess the “Birth Year” field, if those two values match, it means that (with a certain
probability) the two profiles belong to the same user. After investigating the distance
measure (in the numeric case, the absolute value of the subtraction), we found that within
profiles the sample standard deviation (including Bessel’s correction) is an average of 1.8
years. However, across the dataset the sample standard deviation is 12.7 years. In the event
that two “Birth Year” values do not match, this allows us to say with some probability what
the likelihood is that the profiles belong to the same user (if the di"erence between values is
under 1.8 years, the likelihood will be much higher than if it is closer to or over 12.7 years).
Even after performing the aforementioned correlation analysis, it might not be possible
to easily match profiles. Di"erent social networking sites might not reveal the same pieces
of information, or they might not reveal enough of the same pieces of information to be
able to make a strong match. To help alleviate this situation, Table 15 shows the amount
of information that is available for the most popular sites. This information can be used to
determine which sites are most susceptible to this type of matching, and it also provides an
optimal match order.
6.5 Related Work
A brief outline of areas in social networking sites which can compromise a user’s privacy
are discussed in Chew [27]. Some of the areas she discusses include “Activity Streams”,
“Unwelcome Linkage”, and “Merging Social Graphs”. Further, Gross and Acquisti [41]
highlight potential attacks on privacy and also show that a minimal percentage change
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default lax privacy settings.
Krishnamurthy [60] present statistics on privacy settings of two popular Social Networks.
They show that 79% of MySpace allowed their profile, friends, comments and user content
to be viewable. They also showed that a majority of users do not change default privacy
settings of Facebook allowing anyone in the same “Regional Network” to view their profile.
Narayanan and Shmatikov [77] discuss techniques to de-anonymize large social networks
using only network structure. The work presents another method by which relationships
between profiles of the same user on multiple social networks can be identified.
6.6 Conclusion
As social networks continue to grow in size and importance, they begin to pose a number
of interesting privacy challenges for their users. In this paper, we investigated one of those
challenges: large online social footprints. Specifically, we have shown that targeted attacks
on individuals are possible using techniques based on social networking pseudonyms. Based
on our experiments, we have shown that an attacker can reconstruct over 40%, in the best-
case from his perspective, of an individual’s social footprint by using a single pseudonym.
Additionally, an attacker can reconstruct 10% to 35% of an individual’s social footprint by
using the person’s name.
The outlook we present in this chapter makes hope seem bleak, especially with the
aim of social networks being to promote creating online-identities and sharing information
between friends. Normal anonymization methods of k-anonymity and anonymized network
leakage are not used when routinely displaying information to a potential friend, a curious




Social networking sites are of great interest. They are, by nature, platforms for users
to share personal information and experiences with friends and to find potential friends
with common interests. Over one-third of all American adult-internet users use social
networking sites [65], of which 51% participate in multiple social networks. To participate
in a social network, a user has to create a profile to describe herself, and since accurate
profile information allows more e!cient networking, users have an incentive to fill in real
information into their profiles.
Social networks usually contain di"erent pieces of information about personal aspects
of a user, as they target users with a particular interest (e.g., Flickr for photo sharing,
Last.fm for music lovers). Users are encouraged to share information about these interests
and in providing this information to a social network, most users assume that their profile
information will be kept within the boundaries of the social network site. Boundaries
between social network sites can be quite easily blurred using a number of techniques
including deanonymization of many users using friend network graphs has been shown to
be successful [77], and even targeted deanonymization of a user is possible [48].
Unfortunately, social network sites do not protect users from attackers who wish to
combine the disparate pieces of information about a user from multiple sites. This often
exposes more of the victim’s information than from a single site. We call this problem
“unintended personal information leakage” and define a social footprint to be the total
amount of personal information that can be gathered about an online identity by aggregating
available social networks.
This chapter presents the first study on the unintended personal information leak prob-
lem in multiple social networks with the aim of providing a model to measure it and propos-
ing a cloaking solution based on our model. We demonstrate the usefulness of these models
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and proposed solution on over 8,200 real-world social footprints.
More concretely, the first contribution of this chapter is towards a rigorous understanding
of the unintended personal information leakage problem in social networks. We do this in
two parts. First, we define measures to quantify the amount of information in a person’s
social footprint. These measures provide an upper bound, a lower bound, an information
theoretic bound, and a probabilistic bound, on the amount of personal information in a
user’s social footprint. The latter two measures are required in order to take into account
inconsistencies between personal information on multiple social networks. Second, using
approximately 8,200 users’ social footprints, we conduct an empirical study to evaluate
the e"ectiveness of two attacks using a user’s social footprint: an identification attack
and a password recovery attack. We find that the number of users susceptible to the
identification attack increases from 2% for one social network to 18% when using a person’s
social footprint. The number of users susceptible to the password recovery attack follows
a similar trend. The second contribution of the chapter is using cloaking to reduce the
precision or resolution of information released by a person’s profile. Using “Birthdate” as a
sample attribute, we show a reduction of 66% for the information theoretic and probabilistic
attribute leakage measures when cloaking is applied (with a cloaking range of 5).
7.1 Attacks using Unintended Personal Information Leak
To analyze the threat of attacks using personal information aggregated from multiple social
network sites, we need to define a set of attributes required for each attack. We investigate
two attacks previously demonstrated using manual techniques or other scenarios. The sets
of attributes defined for them are:
Physical Identification Attack: Personal Identification Information (PII) is “infor-
mation which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity” [54]. Most social
networks do not explicitly reveal PII, although many do reveal a person’s birthdate, gen-
der, or location. Previous research by Sweeney [95] on U.S. Census data showed that this
particular set of attributes (where location is the City, Town, or Municipality in which the
person resides) can uniquely identify 53% of the U.S. population. Therefore to measure the
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amount of information required for a physical identification attack, we use the following set
of attributes {Birthdate, Gender, Location}.
Password Recovery Attack: Many web sites allow legitimate users to recover their
passwords by providing personal “secret” information (e.g., birthdate and address). The
authentication factor of “something you know” relies on questions being personal in nature.
Unfortunately, attackers often infer the answers from other sources and use this recovery
mechanism to compromise accounts. For users that have publicly available social profiles,
their social footprints provide a rich source of information for attackers to mine information
about that user.
The exact information needed to recover passwords varies among sites and is sometimes
also based on the type of questions a user selects. Based on common password recovery
questions discussed in previous research [56,84,85], we define the set of attributes for a pass-
word recovery attack to consist of {Name, Email, Nickname, Location, Gender, Hometown,
Homepage, Birthdate}.
7.2 Online Social Footprints
We have discussed social footprints in the previous chapter. Here we briefly review how the
boundaries of social networking sites can be blurred, followed by a formal definition of a
user’s social footprint.
7.2.1 Blurring the Boundaries between Social Networks
Constructing a user’s online footprint requires access to information about the same user
on di"erent social networks. This requires identifying a user’s profiles across the boundaries
of distinct social networks. Occasionally users use Online Identity Management sites to
publish links to their profiles for di"erent networks, which make the connections between
social networks explicit. When users do not provide explicit links to their other profiles,
targeted deanonymization of a user is possible [18,48] and also deanonymization of a large
number of users across social networks has been shown to be successful [77].
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7.2.2 Definition of Social Footprint
An attribute f is a piece of information belonging to a person’s profile. It is defined as a
tuple %fa, fv& containing the value fv, of an attribute named fa.
A user’s profile %us is a set of attributes, representing information obtained about a
user u on social network site s. Using Figure 20 as a running example, Bob’s Digg profile
can be represented as %BobDigg = {%“Name”, “Bobby Smith”&, %“Sex”, “Male”&, %“Location” ,
“30332”&, %“Birthdate” , “/1980”&}.
A user’s online identity T is a list of profiles % , which represent a user’s online identity.
In Figure 20, Bob’s online identity has three profiles: %BobDigg, %
Bob
F lickr, and %
Bob
MySpace.






A subset of Bob’s social footprint can be expressed as: PBob = {%“Name”, “Bobby Smith”& ,
%“Name”, “Bob Smith”& , %“Name”, “Bob Smith”&, %“Sex”, “Male”&, . . .}.
7.3 Quantitative Definitions of Aggregate Attribute Leakage
7.3.1 Definition of Attribute Leakage
Attribute Leakage is a measure of the information that can be discovered about a particular
attribute, given a person’s social footprint. We define four measures for attribute leakage:
7.3.1.1 Attribute Leakage Upper-bound
Our first definition of attribute leakage simply checks for the presence of an attribute in a
person’s social footprint. It does not take into account consistency across attribute values
from di"erent profiles and hence is used as an upper-bound for the attribute leakage measure.
Definition "U (fa, P )—Attribute Leakage Upper-bound. Given an attribute name
fa and a user’s social footprint P, the attribute leakage upper-bound is defined as:




0 if fa /' P ,
1 if fa ' P .
94
where fa ' P checks if an attribute tuple, with fa as an attribute name, exists in P . The
“'” notation is used in this manner henceforth.
This measure is also useful in situations where an average over a group of users is
calculated, as it can be interpreted as a count for the number of users. For example, if
the average attribute leakage upper-bound is 0.66 for a group of users, that result can be
interpreted as two-thirds of the group revealing the attribute.
7.3.1.2 Probabilistic Attribute Leakage
Our second definition takes into account the amount of consistency between values of an
attribute across profiles. In this case, we use the relation of consistency being inversely pro-
portional to inconsistency. Based on this, a simple measure could be inversely proportional
to the number of unique values of an attribute, but this discards useful information on the
probability of each value.
As a measure of inconsistency in the second definition, we use the probability of each
unique value (of an attribute) to calculate the expected number of guesses an attacker would
have to make before getting the right value.
Definition "C(fa, P )—Probabilistic Attribute Leakage. Given an attribute name
fa and a user’s social footprint P, the probabilistic attribute leakage is defined as:









if fa ' P .
where U(fa, P ) is a set containing unique attribute tuples (with the attribute name fa) in
a user’s social footprint P . &(i) represents the probability of the ith unique attribute tuple
being picked from the other attribute tuples in P with the same fa.
This measure matches the informal definition of attribute leakage. When all the at-
tribute values are consistent, there is only one unique value, and the associated probability
of the unique value is 1. When the attribute values are inconsistent, the number of unique
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values increases and causes the sum in the denominator (or number of guesses) to increase.
Thus, as the probabilistic attribute leakage increases, an attacker trying to guess the at-
tribute’s exact value would expect to make fewer guesses.
As an optimization, to obtain the minimum number of expected guesses, we order the
list of unique attribute values with the most probable value to least probable value.
Using Bob’s identity in Figure 20 as an example, we calculate the "C . As per our
definition above, U(“Name”, PBob) = {%“Name”,“Bob Smith”&, %“Name”,“Bobby Smith”&}

















We note that in some cases, the values revealed for an attribute might not be factual in
terms of the physical person it represents (i.e., a person might not be truthful in filling out
their online profiles). We argue that this occurs in the minority of cases as it reduces the
utility of a user’s online profiles.
7.3.1.3 Information Theoretic Attribute Leakage
We use the same relation of a measure of consistency being inversely proportional to incon-
sistency. In the third definition, we use entropy [87], a measure of the amount of uncertainty
associated with a variable, as a measure of inconsistency.
Definition "I(fa, P )—Information Theoretic Attribute Leakage. Given an at-
tribute name fa and a user’s social footprint P, the information theoretic attribute leakage
is defined as:




0 if fa /' P ,
1
1 +H(fa, P )
if fa ' P .
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whereH(fa, P ) =
+
x#U(fa,P ) p(x)( log2 p(x). U(fa, P ) is a set containing unique attribute
tuples (with the attribute name fa) in a user’s social footprint P . p(x) represents the
probability of the attribute tuple x being picked from other attribute tuples in P with the
same fa.
Intuitively, entropy can be understood as the number of “smart” guesses it will take
on average to find a value [22]. “Smart” guesses are assumed to be able to eliminate half
the set of possible values on every guess, akin to using a binary search to find a number.
We add one to the value of entropy to represent the fact that even after a binary search
and knowing with certainty that the unguessed attribute value has to be true, we still need
to guess/submit that value. Thus we can see the information theoretic attribute leakage
measure as a representation of how many “smart” guesses it would take to correctly guess
a value.
Using Bob’s identity in Figure 20 as an example, we calculate the information theoretic
attribute leakage. To calculate "I , we first need to calculate the entropy:
H(“Name”, PBob) = p(“Bob Smith”)(" log2 p(“Bob Smith”)























Similar to the probabilistic attribute leakage, as the information theoretic attribute leak-
age increases, an attacker trying to guess the attribute’s true value using “smart” questions
would expect to make fewer guesses.
Comparing "C(“Name”,PBob) with "I(“Name”,PBob), we see that the value for "C is
higher. Initially, this might not make sense because when using “smart” guesses, one would
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expect to be able to guess the right value in fewer attempts. The explanation for this is,
for a small number of unique values, making regular guesses can be faster than making
“smart” guesses, akin to a linear search being quicker than a binary search under the same
conditions.
7.3.1.4 Attribute Leakage Lower-bound
Our final definition of attribute leakage is a measure of consistent attribute values, which
can be treated as a lower-bound for our attribute leakage measures. This is the strictest
measure of attribute leakage where we require the value of an attribute to be leaked and all
values to be consistent.
Definition "L(fa, P )—Attribute Leakage Lower-bound. Given an attribute name
fa and a user’s social footprint P, the attribute leakage lower-bound is defined as:




1 if fa ' P and )i, j, if fai=faj, then fvi=fvj,
0 otherwise.
7.3.2 Definition of Aggregate Attribute Leakage
Measuring attribute leakage for a particular attribute can reveal useful information, but to
quantify the threat of a particular attack, we measure the amount of attribute leakage for
the set of attributes required to execute the attack. We measure this in two ways: first,
measure the total aggregate amount of attribute leakage for the set of attributes required
for an attack; second, measure the total aggregate amount of attribute leakage only if all
attributes are non-zero.
The advantage of the first method is that as the number of attributes (from a set of
attributes defined for a particular aggregate attribute leakage measure) goes up, the amount
of aggregate attribute leakage will go up. Thus, this method will approximate how close a
user is to leaking all the attributes required for an attack. The second method has more
intuitive meaning when looking at a group of users and trying to determine the amount of
aggregate attribute leakage in terms of consistency and ease of attack.
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As di"erent attacks have a di"erent number of attributes required for an attack, the total
aggregate attribute leakage would vary depending on the number of attributes required.
For instance, if two of the three attributes used for an attack are present, two-thirds of
the attributes required are present; if two of the six attributes required for another attack
are present, only one-third of the attributes required are present, but the total aggregate
attribute leakage would be 2 in both cases. Conversely, the total is useful in emphasizing
that more attributes are being leaked if two-thirds of the attributes required for the second
attack are present, namely four attributes are being leaked. For purposes of comparing the
aggregate attribute leak needed for various attacks, we normalize the aggregate measures
to a 0 to 1 range.
We provide two definitions for normalized aggregate attribute leakage, based on the two
methods described above.
7.3.2.1 Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage
Aggregate attribute leakage is the sum of attribute leakage for a set of attributes belonging
to a person’s social footprint. To normalize it to between 0 to 1, we divide by the number
of attributes.
Definition #X(Fa, P )—Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage. Given a set
of attribute names Fa and a user’s social footprint P, the normalized aggregate attribute
leakage is defined as:





whereX represents one of the definitions of attribute leakage—U, I, C, or L for Upperbound,
Information Theoretic, Probabilistic, or Lowerbound, respectively.
7.3.2.2 Actionable Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage
Actionable Aggregate Attribute Leakage is the sum of attribute leakage for a set of attributes
when all the attributes are leaked (in relation to a person’s social footprint). Namely, the
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actionable aggregate attribute leakage is zero if even one of the attributes is not-leaked or
zero. We call this “Actionable Aggregate Attribute leakage” as for an attacker to use a set
of attributes in a particular attack, they would need to have at least some information on
all the attributes. To normalize this value to between 0 to 1, we divide by the number of
attributes.
Definition $X(Fa, P )—Actionable Aggregate Normalized Leakage. Given a set
of attribute names Fa and a user’s social footprint P, the actionable aggregate normalized
attribute leakage is defined as:




0 if *fa ' Fa and fa /' P ,
#X(Fa, P ) otherwise.
whereX represents one of the definitions of attribute leakage—U, I, C, or L for Upperbound,
Information Theoretic, Probabilistic, or Lowerbound, respectively.
Once again, the Upperbound Actionable Aggregate leakage is useful when an average
over a group of users is calculated. This is because, for actionable aggregate leakage, it can
be interpreted as the number of users which have released all the attributes required for a
particular attack.
7.4 Online Identities and Data Collection
Identity management sites allow users to manage their online identities by enabling them to
provide links to their social networking sites. Examples of such online identity management
sites include ClaimId, FindMeOn, FreeYourID, and MyOpenID.
We crawled the public online identities stored by one such identity management site.
During this crawl, we collected 8,268 active online identities—active online identities con-
tained one or more links to a profile on a social networking site. We then identified links
pointing to the top 15 most common social networking sites, which accounted for 21,764
profile links. We proceeded to crawl the profiles associated with each of these links, obtain-
ing a total of 21,764 profiles, belonging to 8,268 users. Further details of the dataset can
be found in the previous chapter.
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To enable us to perform a detailed study on attribute leakages, we wrote parsers for 10
of the top 15 social networking sites—a few social networks were not parsed due to technical
and legal challenges associated with parsing their sites. The parsers performed a great deal
of post-processing to merge attributes with semantically similar meanings but syntactic
di"erences. An example of this is “Age” and “Birthdate”, as Age can be represented as
a coarse granularity birthdate. We also standardized the value of certain attributes across
social networks to semantically equivalent values. For example, if a MySpace user chose “In
a Relationship”, “Engaged”, or “Married”, we standardized the value to “In a Relationship”.
Table 15 shows the amount of information leaked from each site for a small subset
of available attributes. For each attribute, we represent the amount of information as a
percentage of the number of profiles that publicly displayed this value on a particular social
networking site. If a ‘-’ is present, it means the attribute was not revealed by the site in
question.
7.5 Experimental Evaluation and Results
Using the 8,268 social footprints collected, we begin by using the attribute leakage measures
to quantify the amount of information that is discoverable for certain attributes. We then
use the aggregate attribute leakage measures to quantify the amount of aggregate attribute
leakage, with respect to the set of attributes required for attacks (described in Section 7.1).
7.5.1 Attribute Leakage Measures
We expect the overall attribute leakage of a particular attribute to be related to the number
of social networks that reveal that attribute. To test this hypothesis and investigate the
amount of inconsistency that exists between the attribute values revealed on social net-
works, we analyze the di"erent attribute leakage measures for a subset of attributes. To
compute these measures, we calculate the attribute leakage of each attribute in a user’s
social footprint, and then, we average the results across the entire dataset. The result of
these calculations for a subset of attributes is shown in Figure 27. The y-axis shows the
attribute leakage amount, and the x-axis shows the di"erent attributes. For Figures 27-29,






















Figure 27: Attribute Leakages ("i(fa, P )) for a sample of attributes. Each attribute (fa)
is represented by a set of clustered bars on the x-axis and an individual bar represents the
attribute leakages ("i) as defined in Section 7.3.1.
the "U , "I , "C , and "L measures, respectively.
From the figure, we observe two things. First, the leakage for some attributes such as
“Name”, “Location”, and “Homepage” is higher than the leakage for “Relationship” and
“Birthdate” (regardless of which measure is observed). This observation can be explained
using Table 15, where we see that the attributes with low leakage are the ones that are
revealed in a small number of social networks. This confirms our hypothesis that the
overall attribute leakage is related to the number of social networks that reveal the attribute.
Second, we observe that the inconsistency (i.e., the di"erence between the "U and "L values)
for some attributes (e.g., “Name” and “Location”) is much higher than the inconsistency
of other attributes (e.g., “Relationship” and “Sex”). These inconsistencies are due to the
large number of possible values for “Name” and “Location” (thousands) versus the small
set of possible values o"ered to the user for “Relationship” and “Sex” (usually less than 5).
This imbalance of possible values also made our standardization process for “Name” and
“Location” less e"ective than for attributes with a smaller set of possible values.
Although this initial overview is useful, it combines users with a di"erent number of
social networks into one group. To get a deeper understanding of how the attribute leakage























Figure 28: Attribute Leakage measures for “Name” ("i(“Name”, P )). Di"erent attribute






















Figure 29: Attribute Leakage measures for “Hometown” ("i(“Hometown”, P )). Di"erent
attribute leakages ("i) are represented by di"erent lines.
attribute leakage as it relates to the number of social networks. To include cases where
an attacker may only discover a subset of social networks that belong to a user with x
social networks, we include all users where y + x when looking at the attribute leakage
for y social networks. Specifically, we pick every combination of y social networking sites
from the user’s online identify and calculate the average of the attribute leakage metric




combinations. We pick this method because it
avoids introducing biases that any pre-determined ordering might impose. Henceforth, we
employ this technique in all figures that plot leakage against the number of social networks
belonging to a user’s social footprint.



















Number of social networking sites
Hometown
Name
Figure 30: Number of unique values (y-axis) for “Hometown” and “Name” attributes, as
the number of social networking sites in a user’s online footprint increases (x-axis).
“Name” and “Hometown” attributes are shown in Figures 28 and 29, respectively. In both
figures, the y-axis represents the average attribute leakage for users with the number of
social networking sites shown on the x-axis. We investigated the “Name” attribute because
it represents an attribute with varying attribute leakage measures in Figure 27. Conversely,
we studied the “Hometown” attribute because it exhibited mostly similar average attribute
leakage measures.
For the “Name” attribute, we see that the "U attribute leakage for users with one social
network is 0.73, and it quickly rises to 1.0 for users with 4 social networks. This result
is expected because all but one social network reveals the “Name” attribute (as shown
in Table 15). As the number of sites increases, the consistency between attribute values
begins to decline, and "I , "C , and "L begin to diverge. The "I and "C measures increase
slightly at two social networks due to an increase in the number of user social footprint
combinations that contain the “Name” attribute. The downward trend of the "I and "C
measures starting at three social network sites is linked again to the decrease in consistency
between the “Name” values. An investigation of a sample of users with low "C attribute
leakage showed that di"erences in the name formats contributed to these inconsistencies
(e.g., “William Smith”, “Bill”, “Billy”, and “Bill Smith”). Finally, the "L measure can be
directly related to the average number of unique attribute values for the “Name” attribute.
This is also confirmed by Figure 30, which shows the average number of unique attribute
values for the “Name” and “Hometown” attributes. If we compare Figures 28 and 30, we
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see that as the average number of unique attribute values increases, the "L attribute leakage
decreases.
For the “Hometown” attribute, we see that the "U measure for users with one social
network is 0.17, and it consistently increases until its maximum of 0.71 at 9 social networks.
This result is also expected because only 5 social networks reveal the “Hometown” attribute
(as shown in Table 15), and as the number of social networks increases, so does the likelihood
that the value will be discoverable on a network in the user’s social footprint. As the number
of networks increases, the consistency between attributes is very high, and the "I , "C , and
"L measures remain close to the "U measure. This observation can also be confirmed using
the number of unique values of the “Hometown” attribute (as shown in Figure 30). We
attribute the dip in attribute leakage measures at "I , "C , and "L to inconsistencies in
attribute values for some outlying users that have a large number of social networks and
the reduced statistical significance of fewer users with 9 social networks.
The “Name” and “Hometown” attributes both have "I measures that are lower than
the corresponding "C measures. This indicates that an attacker would take more “smart”
guesses to determine the true value of those attributes. As previously mentioned, this
phenomenon can occur when you have a small set of possible guesses and it takes a larger
number of expected “smart” guesses to reach the true value. This can be verified by looking
at the average number of unique values for either attribute in Figure 30.
The average attribute leakage hides information about the distribution of attribute
leakages that make up the average. Figure 31 shows the average information theoretic
attribute leakage for the “Hometown” attribute as well as the normalized density of users
that make up the average, for each number of social networking sites. The x-axis displays the
number of social networking sites, while the y-axis shows the amount of attribute leakage.
The shaded cells indicate the density of users that contribute to the average “Hometown”
information theoretic attribute leakage, normalized across the total number of users that
have x social networking sites or more. The darker the shading of a cell indicates a higher
density of users in that particular attribute leakage range. The graph shows us that the
majority of users lie in the [0,0.05] or (0.95, 1] ranges, with a shift of users towards the (0.95,
105

























Figure 31: Normalized density of users with di"erent hometown information theoretic
attribute leakage ("I(“Hometown!!, P )). The line represents the average hometown infor-
mation theoretic attribute leakage of users with x or more social network sites.
1] range as the number of social networking sites increases. As the amount of information
theoretic attribute leakage increases, this figure indicates that an attacker would need to
make fewer guesses to find the right value for an attribute (e.g., if a user with 3 social
networks has an average "I measure of 0.37, an attacker must make an average of 2.7
“smart” guesses to get the right value for the attribute; if a user with 6 social networks has
an average "I measure of 0.53, an attacker must make an average of 1.9 guesses to get the
right value for the attribute1).
So far we have used a number of measures to look at the attribute leakage for a particular
attribute. This has helped confirm our hypotheses and make interesting observations, which
were originally presented using the definitions of the measures. In the next section, we
investigate the aggregate attribute leakage measures to determine the leakage of a set of
attributes in relation to particular attacks.
1The denominators of both !I and !C are intuitively the number of guesses it would take an attacker to
guess the right value for an attribute. Thus, taking the reciprocal of 0.37 and 0.53 gives us the number of
guesses.
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7.5.2 Aggregate Attribute Leakage Measures
The aggregate attribute leakage measures o"er a combined view of the information leaked
by a set of attribute required for a particular attack (as defined in Section 7.1). We begin by
looking at the overall aggregate attribute leakage measures, shown in Figure 32, to quantify
the average exposure of the users in our dataset to the particular attacks. The x-axis
represents the di"erent attacks, while the y-axis represents the average aggregate attribute
leakage. For Figures 32-33, the Upperbound, Information Theoretic, Probabilistic, and
Lowerbound labels represent the #U , #I , #C , and #L measures, respectively. The #U for
both attacks is above 0.5, which means that on average, users reveal more than half of
the attributes required for those attacks. Although the average aggregate attribute leakage
measures #I and #C still take into account consistency di"erences between attribute values
revealed, the intuitive meaning—being the number of guesses to find the right value for a set
of attributes—is lost. A social footprint whose "I(“Birthdate”, P ) = 0, "I(“Location”, P ) =
0, and "I(“Gender”, P ) = 1 has an average identification aggregate attribute leakage of 0.33.
The incorrect intuition derived from this result would be that ,3 questions would be needed
to guess the value of each attribute. However, since two of the three attributes are not leaked
at all, these values cannot be guessed. If viewed in relation to #U , which would be 0.33 in
the above example, we would know that only one attribute on average is leaked as the #U
would equal #I .
Once again, although this initial view provides a good overview of the di"erent mea-
sures, we would like to see how the aggregate attribute leakage changes as the number of
social networks discovered by an attacker increases. This would also allow us to test our
hypothesis that the aggregate attribute leakage increases as the number of social networks
increases. Figure 33 shows the average aggregate attribute leakage, represented on the y-
axis, as the number of social networking sites an attacker discovers (shown on the x-axis)
increases. From this figure, we observe that the upperbound average identification aggre-
gate attribute leakage is 0.34 (average 1 attribute of 3 attributes) with one social network,
which increases to over 0.9 (average 2.7 attributes of 3 attributes) with six or more social

































Figure 32: Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage (#i(Fa, P )) for defined attacks. Each
attack is represented by a set of clustered bars on the x-axis and di"erent aggregate nor-

































Figure 33: Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage (#i(Fa, P )) for the Identification at-
tack. Di"erent aggregate attribute leakages (#i) are represented by di"erent lines.
checks for the presence of a attribute, this result implies that with one social network a
person reveals 1 attribute of data required (on average) for the identification aggregate
attribute leakage attack. However, with more than 6 social networks, a person reveals an
average of 2.7 attributes. The lowerbound identification aggregate attribute leakage peaks
at 0.6 with four social networks, and then, it declines. This occurs because location, one of
the attributes needed for identification leakage, has varying representations on various so-
cial networks, and as the number of social networks increases, these inconsistencies increase
(even after our standardization e"orts). We find that our hypothesis is supported by the
upperbound measure, which shows that the amount of information an attacker discovers































Figure 34: Actionable Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage ($i(Fa, P )) for defined
attacks. Each attack is represented by a set of clustered bars on the x-axis and di"erent
aggregate normalized attribute leakages ($i) by individual bars.
consistency measures (#I ,#C , and #L), which show that this increase in information is o"-
set by inconsistencies between attribute values causing the average identification aggregate
attribute leakage to decrease past a certain number of social networking sites.
Although Figure 33 shows the average aggregate attribute leakage, it does not show
the actionable aggregate attribute leakage (i.e., the number of users whose social footprints
contained all of the attributes). Figure 34 shows the di"erent actionable aggregate attribute
leakage measures, grouped by attack with the Upperbound, Information Theoretic, Proba-
bilistic, and Lowerbound labels represent the $U , $I , $C , and $L measures, respectively
(this convention is also used for Figure 35. From this figure, we observe that the $U mea-
sures for the identification and password recovery attacks are 0.18 and 0.09, respectively.
This means that 18% and 9% of all users in our dataset reveal at least some information
for all the attributes necessary for the identification and password recovery attacks, re-
spectively. The identification attack has the highest actionable aggregate attribute leakage
because it only requires 3 fairly common attributes to be revealed. In comparison, the
password recovery attack contains 8 attributes, and some of them are fairly sensitive and
only revealed on one social networking site.
Figure 35 shows the actionable identification aggregate normalized attribute leakage,
represented on the y-axis, as the number of social networks a user has (shown on the x-axis)


































Figure 35: Actionable Aggregate Normalized Attribute Leakage ($i(Fa, P )) for the Iden-
tification attack. Di"erent actionable aggregate attribute leakages ($i) are represented by
di"erent lines.
changes as the number of social network sites discovered increases and if this matches the
change of the average aggregate attribute leakage as the number of social network sites
discovered increases. We see that even with one social networking site, a number of users
(average of 0.02, which translates to 2% of users) reveal all the attributes necessary for
an identification attack. The upperbound increases to about 90% (average of 0.9, which
translates to 90% of users), indicating that the higher the number of social networks a user
belongs to, the higher the likelihood of them being vulnerable to this attack. Another way
to explain this is that as the number of social networks increases, it is more likely for a user
to have a profile on a social network where this information is revealed. The $I and $C
measures are similar to #I and #C in that they do not retain their constituent attribute
leakage measure’s intuitive meaning (i.e., calculating the average number of guesses required
to guess the true value for a set of attributes will not equal the average of the number of
guesses of the constituent attributes). Thus, even $I and $C should only be used in
relation to $U . We also see the probabilistic and information theoretic leakage decrease
slightly around 8 social networking sites. This, once again, is due to location being revealed
on multiple social network sites and the attribute value not being consistent.
We have used the aggregate attribute leakage measures to quantify the average and
actionable aggregate attribute leakage. Doing so in a number of ways showed the value
of the aggregate attribute leakage measures, while confirming our original hypotheses. We
110
submit that the #U and $U bounds are likely of most interest when looking to quantify
the likelihood of a threat. Also, taking the #C , #I , $C , and $I measures in relation to the
#U and $U bounds, respectively, is the appropriate way to look at the consistencies of the
information required in these attacks.
7.6 Applying Cloaking to Counter Information Leak
One solution to the aggregate attribute leakage problem is for social networks to limit or
cloak attributes released to non-friends or unauthenticated users on the social network site.
Social network services often prefer to expose profile information of users to enable social
activities such as linking users with common interests, but precise information is often
unnecessary.
Popular approaches to anonymizing data, including k-anonymity or l-diversity, do not
directly apply to social networks because in social networks, each user needs to be iden-
tifiable (most commonly using a name and picture) so that others on the social network
can add or interact with such individual users. By cloaking “sensitive” attributes released
to non-friends or unauthenticated users, we want to limit the attribute leakage without
a"ecting identifiability.
7.6.1 Cloaking Attributes
Cloaking is an operation to reduce the amount of information revealed by a certain attribute.
The cloaking operation requires semantic information to be associated with the attribute
being cloaked to allow controlled reduction of information. We define three main types of
attributes and associated cloaking operations:
Numeric attributes: To cloak numeric attributes, we release a range of values rather
than a single value. To do this, one would require pre-defined ranges to be specified for the
particular attribute. On cloaking the attribute for a particular user, the range would be
revealed instead of the specific value of the attribute. For example, for the attribute “age”,
the social network would have pre-existing ranges for the age (e.g., 15-19, 20-24) that could
be revealed instead of the actual value.
Categorical attributes: To cloak categorical attributes, semantic information about a
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Figure 36: User Bob Smith’s Online Social Footprint (from Figure 20), after being cloaked.
hierarchy of possible values would be required. Instead of releasing the user’s specific
attribute value, the attribute at the higher level (given that each parent level has more than
one child level) would be released. An example of this would be the “location” attribute,
which could range from a street name, to a zip code, to a municipal name, to the name
of a city, and finally, to the state. Some attributes may not have semantic information
associated with them or may not possess a parent; in such cases, the cloak operation would
simply suppress the attribute.
Free-text attributes: Free-text attributes are harder to cloak as the cloak operation would
have to perform “summarization” to reduce the amount of free-text when the attribute is
being cloaked. We do not implement the cloak operation in this manner and simply suppress
such attributes.
7.6.2 Attribute Leakage with Cloaking
Attribute leakage is used as a core part of the calculation of aggregate attribute leakage,
and as a result, we show the e"ect of cloaking on the di"erent attribute leakage ("i(fa, P ))
measures.
"U (fa, P ), will remain unchanged if any number of social networks cloak their at-
tributes because this is the upper-bound, which simply checks if the value is released or
not. "C(fa, P ) relies on the list of attribute values revealed by a user’s social footprint.
Assuming the user’s social footprint contains only one social network and cloaking the at-
tribute introduces r di"erent values (e.g., a numeric attribute is cloaked to a range of r
values or a categorical attribute is cloaked to a parent that has at least r sub-values), then






























Figure 37: Attribute Leakage of Birthdate, after being cloaked. Di"erent cloak ranges are
shown on the x-axis with the resulting attribute leakage on the y-axis.
with an equal probability). The denominator (or the number of guesses required) would
be r+12 (we omit the straight-forward derivation due to space-constraints), resulting in an
attribute leakage of 2r+1 . For example, if r is 5, the expected number of guesses required
would be 3, and the resulting attribute leakage would be 13 . "I(fa, P ) behaves similar
to "C(fa, P ). Using the previous assumptions the resulting denominator (or number of
“smart” guesses required) is 1 + log 1r . Once again, with any cloak range r greater than 1,
this resulting value will be greater than 1. For a cloak range of 5, the expected number of
guesses required would be 3.3, and the resulting attribute leakage would be 0.30. There are
a number of other complex cases for "I(fa, P ) and "C(fa, P ), but in each case, the attribute
leakage monotonically decreases. "L(fa, P ) will always be zero even if one social network
releases the attribute in its cloaked form.
Figure 36 shows the result of cloaking the user Bob Smith’s information from Figure 20.
The free-text attributes are completely suppressed, and the categorical attributes Location
and Hometown are cloaked to the city and state level, respectively. The birthdate attribute
is converted to birthyear and cloaked as a numeric attribute.
7.6.3 Experimental Evaluation of Cloaking
For the experimental evaluation of cloaking attributes, we look at the birthdate attribute
because it is one of the attributes that we have defined the operation over.
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The cloaking operation for birthdate strips o" the birthday and birthmonth, leaving
only the birthyear. Additionally, we cloak the year by providing a range of r values instead
of a single value. We use the same cloak range for each social network site, but the ranges
di"er based on the birthyear of the youngest profile present on the site. As an example, the
range of years (when the cloak range size is 5) for an individual 21 years of age is 20-24,
19-23, 21-25, and 21-25 for Digg, LiveJournal, MySpace, and YouTube, respectively.
Figure 37 shows the average attribute leakage (y-axis) of cloaking the birthdate attribute
with di"erent cloak ranges, represented by a cluster of bars on the x-axis, over the entire
dataset. “No cloaking” represents the original attribute leakage without any cloaking. As
expected, the Upperbound Attribute leakage is not a"ected by cloaking and the Lower-
bound Attribute leakage is zero if cloaking is applied (regardless of cloak range). Both the
Information Theoretic Attribute leakage and the Probabilistic Attribute leakage reduce as
the size of the range increases, due to more expected guesses needing to be made to arrive
at the right value. The Information Theoretic Attribute leakage becomes higher than the
Probabilistic Attribute leakage after the range is increased to 8 (not shown).
7.7 Related Work
Krishnamurthy et al. [60] present statistics on privacy settings of two popular social net-
works. They show that 79% of MySpace allowed their profile, friends, comments, and
user content to be viewable. Sophos [88] similarly looks at the default privacy settings of
Facebook and finds them quite lax. From a sampling of 200 users of 1.2 million users in
the London regional network they find 54% show their full birthdate and 1% divulge their
phone number. Gross et al. [41], in addition to showing that Facebook users at CMU do not
use the privacy limiting preferences, contains an excellent discussion about the real world
implications and ways in which social network information can be misused. Based on CMU
users on Facebook, they provide statistics about participation, information validity, as well
as types and amount of information revelation. Chew et al. [27], compliment this discussion
by providing examples on how “Activity Streams”, “Unwelcome Linkage”, and “Merging
Social Graphs”, can compromise a user’s privacy. Mislove et al. [74] study the graphs of
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multiple social networks, providing interesting measurements and observations of their the
stucture.
Anonymization of public datasets containing sensitive attributes has been studied ex-
tensively with techniques such as k-anonymity [96], '-diversity [67], and t-closeness [66].
Each of these techniques aims to generalize or suppress quasi-identifiers in-order to prevent
linkage to secondary datasets or prior knowledge. This is done to protect the “sensitive”
attributes released along with the quasi-identifiers. In each case, the benefit of using such
anonymization techniques is the controlled reduction of utility in relation to privacy.Our
aims di"er from these as we propose cloaking the sensitive attributes released publicly (to
non-friends and unauthenticated users) in an e"ort to reduce a user’s unintended personal
information leakage.
7.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have defined quantitative measures that provide varying bounds on
unintended personal information leakage. Using approximately 8,200 users’ social footprints
from an online identity management site, we study the amount of aggregate attribute leakage
in our dataset making observations that would not have been possible without our measures.
We also use the measures to verify a number of hypotheses, in regards to the amount of
personal information being discoverable as the number of social network sites a user belongs
to increases. Concretely, looking at the identification attack, we find that only 2% of users
are vulnerable when looking at one social site, but this increases to 18% when looking at a
person’s social footprint. The password recovery attack follows a similar trend. We show
cloaking can e"ectively be used to reduce the amount of information an attacker can obtain
from a person’s social footprint. Using the “Birthdate” attribute, we show a reduction
of 66% for the Information Theoretic and Probabilistic attribute leakage measures when




Social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter are arguably the fastest
growing web-based online services today. Facebook, for example, has been reporting growth
rates as high as 3% per week, with more than 400 million registered users as of March
2010 [15]. Many users appreciate social networks because they make it easier to meet new
people, find old friends, and share multimedia artifacts such as videos and photographs.
One of the key features of social networks is the support they provide for finding new
friends. For example, a typical technique consists of automatically identifying common
friends in cliques and then promoting new friendships with messages such as “You have
4 mutual friends with John Doe. Would you like to add John Doe as a new friend?”.
Also, information on the activities of users are often collected, analyzed, and correlated to
determine the probability that two users may know each other. If a potential acquaintance
is detected, a new friendship recommendation might be displayed by the social network site
when the user logs in.
Clearly, social networks are critical applications with respect to the security and privacy
of their users. In fact, the large amount of information published, and often publicly shared,
on the user profiles is increasingly attracting the attention of attackers. Attacks on social
networks are usually variants of traditional security threats (such as malware, worms, spam,
and phishing). However, these attacks are carried out in a di"erent context by leveraging
the social networks as a new medium to reach the victims. Moreover, adversaries can take
advantage of the trust relationships between “friends” in social networks to craft more
convincing attacks by exploiting personal information gleaned from victims’ pages.
Past research has shown that users of online social networks tend to exhibit a higher
degree of trust in friend requests and messages sent by other users (e.g., [13,23]). In addition,
some forms of attacks on social networks, such as the problem of unsolicited messages, have
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already been studied in detail by the research community (e.g., [47,93]). However, to date,
reverse social engineering attacks in social networks have not received any attention. Hence,
no previous work exists on the topic.
In a reverse social engineering attack, the attacker does not initiate contact with the
victim. Rather, the victim is tricked into contacting the attacker herself. As a result, a
high degree of trust is established between the victim and the attacker as the victim is the
entity that first wanted to establish a relationship. Once a reverse social engineering attack
is successful (i.e., the attacker has established a friend relationship with the victim), she
can then launch a wide range of attacks such as persuading victims to click on malicious
links, blackmailing, identity theft, and phishing.
This chapter presents the first user study on how attackers can abuse some of the
features provided by online social networks with the aim of launching automated reverse
social engineering attacks. We present three novel attacks, namely, recommendation-based,
visitor tracking-based, and demographics-based reverse social engineering. Furthermore,
using the popular social networks Facebook, Badoo, and Friendster, we discuss and measure
the e"ectiveness of these attacks, and we show which social networking features make such
attacks feasible in practice.
In the recommendation attack, the aim is to exploit the friend recommendations made
by the social network to promote the fake profile of a fictitious user to the victim. The hope,
from the attacker’s point of view, is that the victim will be intrigued by the recommendation,
and will attempt to contact the bogus profile that is under the attacker’s control. In the
visitor tracking attack, the aim is to trigger the target’s curiosity by simply browsing her
profile page. The notification that the page has been visited may be enough to attract the
target to visit the attacker profile. Finally, in the demographic-based attack scenario, the
attacker attempts to reach his victims by forging fake demographic or personal information
with the aim of attracting the attention of users with similar preferences (e.g., similar
musical tastes, similar interests, etc.).
Our findings suggest that, contrary to the common folk wisdom, only having an account
with an attractive photograph may not be enough to recruit a high number of unsuspecting
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victims. Rather, the attacker needs to provide victims with a pretext and an incentive for
establishing contact.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We present the first user study on reverse social engineering in social networks and
present three novel attacks. In particular, we discuss and measure how attackers can
abuse some of the friend-finding features that online social networks provide with the
aim of launching automated reverse social engineering attacks against victims.
• We measure how di"erent user profile attributes and friend recommendation features
a"ect the success of reverse social engineering attempts.
• We study the interactions of users with accounts that have been set up to perform
reverse social engineering, and provide insights into why users fall victim to such
attacks.
• We propose mitigation techniques to secure social networks against reverse social
engineering attempts.
8.1 Reverse Social Engineering in Social Networks
Online social engineering attacks are easy to propagate, di!cult to trace back to the at-
tacker, and usually involves a low cost per targeted user. They are well-known threats in
which the attacker aims at influencing the victims, and making them perform actions on her
behalf. The attacker is typically interested in tricking the victims into revealing sensitive
or important information. Examples of these attacks include traditional e-mail hoaxes and
phishing, or their more advanced targeted forms, such as spear phishing.
Most online social engineering attacks rely on some form of “pretexting” [75]. That is,
the attacker establishes contact with the target, and sends some initial request to bootstrap
the attack. This approach, although e"ective because it can reach a large number of poten-
tial victims, has the downside that Internet users are becoming more and more suspicious





Figure 38: Di"erent types of Reverse Social Engineering attacks.
to raise levels of trust by impersonating an existing friend of the target (e.g., [23,50]) or by
injecting the attack into existing chat conversations [62].
Reverse Social Engineering (RSE) is a form of social engineering attack that has not yet
been reported widely in an online context. RSE is a well-known technique in the hacker
community (e.g., [75]) for targeted phone attacks. The attack, in a first step, relies on some
form of “baiting” to stimulate the victim’s curiosity. In a second step, once the victim’s
interest is raised, the attacker waits for the victim to make the initial approach and initiate
contact. An RSE attack usually requires the attacker to create a persona that would seem
attractive to the victim and that would encourage the victim to establish contact. For
example, directly calling users and asking them for their passwords on the phone might
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raise suspicion in some users. In the reverse social engineering version of the same attack,
a phone number can be e-mailed to the targets a couple of days in advance by spoofing
an e-mail from the system administrator. The e-mail may instruct the users to call this
number in case of problems. In this example, any victim who calls the phone number would
probably be less suspicious and more willing to share information as she has initiated the
first contact.
RSE attacks are especially attractive for online social networks. First, from an attacker’s
point of view, there is a good potential to reach millions of registered users in this new social
setting. Second, RSE has the advantage that it can bypass current behavioral and filter-
based detection techniques that aim to prevent wide-spread unsolicited contact. Third, if
the victim contacts the attacker, less suspicion is raised, and there is a higher probability
that a social engineering attack (e.g., phishing, a financial scam, information theft, etc.)
will be successful.
In general, Reverse Social Engineering attacks can be classified based on two main
characteristics:
• Targeted/Un-targeted : In a targeted attack, the attacker focuses on a particular user.
In contrast, in an un-targeted attack, the attacker is solely interested in reaching as
many users as possible. Note that in order to perform a targeted attack, the attacker
has to know (or acquire) some previous information about the target (e.g., such as
her username or e-mail address).
• Direct/Mediated : In a direct attack, the baiting action of the attacker is visible to the
targeted users. For example, an attacker can post a message on a public forum, or
publish some interesting picture on a website. Mediated attacks, in contrast, follow a
two-step approach in which the baiting is collected by an intermediate agent that is
then responsible for propagating it (often in a di"erent form) to the targeted users.
In the following, we present three di"erent combinations of RSE attacks within the




Recommendation systems in social networks propose relationships between users based on
background, or “secondary knowledge” on users. This knowledge derives from the interac-
tions between registered users, the friend relationships between them, and other artifacts
based on their interaction with the social network. For example, the social networking site
might record the fact that a user has visited a certain profile, a page, a picture, and also
log the search terms she has entered. Popular social networks (e.g., Facebook) often use
this information to make recommendations to users (e.g., “Visit page X ”, “You might know
person Y, click here to become her friends”, etc.).
From an attacker’s point of view, a recommendation system is an interesting target.
If the attacker is able to influence the recommendation system and make the social net-
work issue targeted recommendations, she may be able to trick victims into contacting her.
Figure 38(a) demonstrates the recommendation system-based RSE attack scenario.
8.1.2 Demographic-Based RSE
Characteristics: [Un-targeted, Mediated]
Demographic-based systems in social networks allow establishing friendships based on the
information in a person’s profile. Some social networks, especially dating sites (e.g., Badoo),
use this technique as the norm for connecting users in the same geographical location, in
the same age group, or those who have expressed similar preferences.
Figure 38(b) demonstrates an RSE attack that uses demographic information. In the
attack, the attacker simply creates a profile (or a number of profiles) that would have a high
probability of appealing to certain users, and then waits for victims to initiate contact.
8.1.3 Visitor Tracking-Based RSE
Characteristics: [Targeted, Direct]
Visitor tracking is a feature provided by some social networks (e.g., Xing, Friendster) to
allow users to track who has visited their online profiles.
121
Table 16: RSE attacks on three popular social networks. ! indicates that the attack is
possible; " indicates that we demonstrate and measure the e"ectiveness of this attack on
the particular social network.
Type of Attack Facebook Badoo Friendster
Recommendation-Based !" - -
Demographic- Based ! !" !
Visitor Tracking-Based - ! !"
The attack in this case involves exploiting the user’s curiosity by visiting their profile
page. The notification that the page has been visited might raise interest, baiting the user
to view the attacker’s profile and perhaps take some action. Figure 38(c) outlines this attack
method.
8.2 RSE Attacks in the Real-World
In this section, we present three types of real-world RSE attacks that are possible on
three di"erent social network platforms: Facebook, Badoo, and Friendster. In particular,
we describe a recommendation-based RSE attack on Facebook, a demographic-based RSE
attack on Badoo, and a visitor tracking-based RSE attack on Friendster.
Table 16 shows the social networks that were used in our experiments, and also describes
which kind of RSE attacks are possible against them. Note that not all the combinations
are possible in practice. For example, Facebook does not provide any information about
the users that visit a certain profile, thus making a visitor tracking attack infeasible. In
the rest of this section, we describe the di"erent steps that are required to automate the
attacks, and the setup of the experiments we performed.
8.2.1 Ethical and Legal Considerations
Real-world experiments involving social networks may be considered an ethically sensitive
area. Clearly, one question that arises is if it is ethically acceptable and justifiable to conduct
experiments that involve real users. Similar to the experiments conducted by Jakobsson et
al. [51, 52] and our previous work [23], we believe that realistic experiments are the only
way to reliably estimate success rates of attacks in the real-world.
Furthermore, during all the experiments we describe in the chapter, we took into account
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the privacy of the users, and the sensitivity of the data that was collected. When the data
was analyzed, identifiers (e.g., names) were anonymized, and no manual inspection of the
collected data was performed.
Note that all the experiments described in the chapter were performed in Europe. Hence,
we consulted with the legal department of our institution (comparable to the Institute
Review Board (IRB) in the US) and our handling and privacy precautions were deemed
appropriate and consistent with the European legal position.
8.2.2 Influencing Friend Recommendations
A good example of a real recommendation system is Facebook’s friend suggestions. During
our tests with Facebook, we observed that Facebook promotes the connection of users by
suggesting them friends that they probably know. The system computes these suggestions
based on common information, such as mutual friends, schools, companies, and interests.
This feature is well-known to many social network users. In fact, whenever a user is logged
in, she is regularly notified of persons that she may know.
Previous work [18] has shown that Facebook also uses the e-mail addresses a user has
queried to identify a possible friendship connection between two users. The premise is that
if users know each other’s e-mail addresses, they must be connected in some way. Therefore,
if an attacker gains access to the e-mail address of a victim (e.g., a spammer who has a
list of e-mails at her disposal), by searching for that address, she can have a fake attacker
profile be recommended to the victims. In our experiments, we observed that this technique
results in the attacker profile being the most highly recommended profile.
For the first experiment, we used the data collected for over a year in a previous study
we performed on Facebook [18]. In the study, we registered a single account that we used
to perform a large number of e-mail search queries, using an email list obtained from a
dropzone on a machine compromised by attackers. Without our knowledge, our profile
was later recommended to all the queried users as a potential friend. As a result, our test
account received thousands of messages and friend requests.
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Table 17: Characteristics of the dummy profiles used in the experiments
Attribute Prof. 1 Prof. 2 Prof. 3 Prof. 4 Prof. 5
Age 23 23 23 35 23
Sex Male Female Female Female Female
Location* N.Y. N.Y. Paris N.Y. N.Y.
Real Picture Yes Yes Yes Yes No
8.2.3 Measuring RSE E"ects by Creating Attack Profiles
In the second set of experiments, we created five di"erent attack profiles in three social
networks. The profiles were designed with di"erent characteristics to enable us to observe
and measure the e"ects that each characteristic had on the e"ectiveness of the RSE attacks.
That is, we were interested in determining which features would attract the higher number of
potential victims using the recommendation-based, demographic-based, and visitor tracking
attacks.
The five attack profiles are shown in Table 17. For the profile pictures, we used popular
photographs from Wikipedia, licensed under the Creative Commons license. All photos
represented an attractive male or female, with the exception of Profile 5 for which we used
a synthetic cartoon picture.
Table 18 shows the number of users we targeted in the social networks we tested. For
example, in the Facebook experiment, we targeted a total of 250,000 profiles, equally divided
between the 5 attack profiles. In the demographic-based attack on Badoo, no action was
required on behalf of the attacker. Hence, the number of targeted users is not given (i.e.,
all registered Badoo users could have found and contacted the attacker profile).
Table 18: Overview of OSNs as well as number of users targeted.
Social Network # of Targets Total users Alexia Rank
Badoo - 73 million 143
Facebook 250,000 500 million 2
Friendster 42,000 8.2 million 643
8.2.4 Automating the Measurement Process
During our study we developed a number of scripts to automate the three attacks and the
measurement process on the di"erent social networks.
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8.2.4.1 Recommendation-Based RSE on Facebook
As shown in Figure 38(a), the recommendation-based RSE attack against Facebook con-
sisted of two parts: First, the target user’s profile was probed using an e-mail lookup, and
second, the attack accounts were automatically monitored for victims who contacted these
accounts based on the friendship recommendation made by Facebook.
For the first part, we used the “contact import” functionality provided by Facebook and
the API provided by Google Mail’s address book to automatically search for users by their
e-mail addresses. We broke the total set of users we wished to query into smaller sets, and
sent multiple requests to Facebook, as they have limited the number of e-mail addresses
that can be queried using a single request (because of recommendations made in previous
work [18]).
In the second part of the experiments, we wrote an API that allowed us to interact with
Facebook to accept friend requests, fetch user profiles, as well as fetch any private message
that may have been sent to the attack profiles.
Note that CAPTCHAs in Facebook were only encountered if we were not careful about
rate limiting.
8.2.4.2 Demographic-Based RSE on Badoo
We used Badoo to test the demographic-based RSE attack. Hence, we only had to cre-
ate the attack profiles and automatically monitor incoming connections. Just like in the
recommendation-based RSE attack, we automatically retrieved and collected any message
sent to the attacker profiles. Furthermore, as Badoo allows to see which users have visited
a profile, we also logged this information.
8.2.4.3 Visitor Tracking-Based RSE on Friendster
We used Friendster to perform the RSE attack based on visitor tracking. As shown in
Figure 38(c), this attack consists of two parts: First, we visit the target user’s profile and as
a consequence, the system shows to the victim that someone has visited her profile. If the


































Figure 39: Daily number of new friend requests in the initial Facebook experiment
second step, the visits and the incoming messages to the attack profiles were automatically
monitored to determine which of the victims came back and initiated contact.
8.3 Experimental Results
8.3.1 Recommendation-based RSE Attack
8.3.1.1 Initial Experiment
During the study [18] we conducted, we observed that the test account we were using to
query e-mail addresses were receiving a large number of friend requests. The profile used
in this attack was similar to Profile 2 described in Table 17.
Figure 39 shows the number of daily friend requests received by the account used in this
initial experiment. The graph shows that during the first two months, the account received
an average of 45 requests per day, followed by an increase to an average of 75 requests per
day for the next 6 months.
The rapid increase in the number of request is the consequence of the cascading e"ect
that commenced when we started accepting the incoming invitations. The fact that the
account had a large number of friends built up the “reputation” of our profile. In addition,
we started being advertised by Facebook to new people with whom we shared common
friends.
Of the over 500,000 e-mails queried by our decoy profile, we were contacted by over
17,000 users (i.e., 3.3% friend connect rate within 9 months and 0.37% friend connect rate
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per month). Note that our test account reached both the maximum number of active friend
connections and the total number of pending friend requests allowed by Facebook.
8.3.1.2 Controlled, In-Depth Experiments
After the success of the initial experiment, we started a number of controlled, in-depth
experiments to measure and determine which profile characteristics and social network
features a"ect the success rates of RSE attacks.
To reach our goal, we created five attack profiles on Facebook. For each profile, we ran-
domly selected 50,000 target users and looked up their e-mail addresses (hence, influencing
the recommendations made by Facebook). We then measured the number of friend-requests,
private messages, and other interaction sent to each attack profile. Figure 40 depicts the
result of this experiment. The y-axis represents the cumulative number of friend requests
or messages for the period represented by the date on the x-axis.
Profiles 2 and 3 were the most successful in terms of the number of friend requests
and messages that were received. Both profiles correspond to attractive females who are
interested in friendship. Note that there was no correlation with the location of the attack
profile (i.e., the location did not influence friend requests). Hence, an initial analysis seems
to confirm the general intuition that an attractive female photograph will attract potential
victims. In contrast to the other profiles, Profile 5 was the least e"ective. In this profile,
a cartoon character was used as a photograph rather than a real picture. In comparison,
Profile 1 performed only slightly better than Profile 5. This profile contained the photograph
of an attractive male.
Over the entire month, the most e"ective profile had a friend connection rate of 0.35%
(i.e., in line with the initial experimental profile). The least e"ective profile instead, had a
friend connection rate of only 0.05%.
Although friend connection requests and private messages were the most common form
of interaction with a decoy profile, we also received a large number of friend suggestions.
Friend suggestions are suggestions made by the victim to other users. Such suggestions are
































































(b) Messages sent to each profile
Figure 40: Cumulative counts of interactions resulting from reverse social engineering on
Facebook.
and the victim. Also, note that over 94% of the messages to the attack profiles were sent
after the friend connection requests.
By analyzing the demography of the users who contacted our attack profiles, we can
identify potential characteristics that make a decoy profile appealing. In particular, we
focused on three fields: relationship status, interested in, and age (Figure 41). The y-axis
of the figure shows the percentage of friend connection requests that originated from a
profile with the respective demographic value (empty values excluded) to the attack profile
listed on the x-axis. Young, single users who have expressed interest in “Women” seem to
be the easiest victims to attract. In comparison, Profile 1 (the only male profile) received
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a larger number of friend requests from users who had expressed interest in “Men”.
Interestingly, the profile with a cartoon picture was the one to attract the largest num-
ber of requests coming from older users (i.e., those who were older than 40). Hence, the
experiments show that by carefully tweaking the profile information, it is possible to obtain
an higher success rate against a particular group of users.
Finally, we analyzed the messages that were sent to the di"erent attack profiles. To
protect the privacy of individuals in the study, we first processed the messages and removed
user identifiers. After anonymization, we only ran word-based statistical analyses on the
message contents. That is, as a pre-processing step, we used Porter’s stemming algorithm
on the extracted tokens [80], followed by a count of n-grams (where a single gram is a
stemmed token).
Around 10% of the messages mentioned the Facebook recommendation, including 3-
grams such as “suggest you as” or “suggest I add”. The analysis shows that some users
used the recommendation made by the social network as a pretext to contact the attack
profile.
8.3.2 Demographic-based Experiment
For our demographic-based RSE attacks, we targeted Badoo, a dating oriented socializing
system that allows users to meet new friends in a specific area. A registered user can list
the people who have visited her profile and exchange messages with other users. Figure 42
shows the cumulative number of visitors and messages received for each attack profile we
created in the network.
Profiles 2 and 3 were again the most popular, and attracted the most visitors (over 2500
each). These profiles also received the largest number of messages (i.e., more than 2500
each). Because Profile 5 was not using a photograph of a person, it was removed by Badoo
from the demographic search after it was visited by 451 users and it received 383 messages.
Once again, Profile 1, the attack profile of a male user, received the fewest visits and friend
requests.
Another measure of how successful an attack profile was is the percentage of users who
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decided to send a message after visiting a profile. These figures are over 50% for the two
attractive female profiles (Profile 2 and 3), and 44% on average for all attack profiles.
We took a closer look at the demography of the users who contacted us. In the case
of Badoo, sending a message is the most concrete form of interest, and one that can easily
be exploited (e.g., [23]). Figure 43 shows a demographic breakdown by relationship status,
what users were interested in, and age. Similar to Figure 41, the y-axis shows the percentage
of users who sent messages that originated from a profile with the respective demographic
value.
Note that Badoo is a site that is geared towards dating. Most of the users who initiate
contact express that they are either single, or in an “open relationship”. In general, the
attack profiles only attracted users of the opposite gender. The age demographic shows
that most of the victims belong to the same age group that the attack profile belongs to.
In comparison, there was no correlation of age for contact requests on Facebook.
Another important di"erence with respect to Facebook was that the location was sig-
nificant in Badoo. In fact, almost all the messages were sent by people living in the same
country as the attack profile.
Finally, the 3-grams analysis for the messages received on Badoo showed that the most
popular term was “how are you” occurring over 700 times. Other popular lines included
“get to know” and “would you like”, “you like” . . . “chat” or “meet”.
8.3.3 Visitor Tracking Experiment
In the visitor tracking RSE attack, we used each of the five attack profiles to visit 8,400
di"erent user profiles in Friendster. As we have already previously described, on Friendster
a user can check which other users have visited her profile.
In our experiment, we tracked which victims visited our attack profiles, and then counted
the number of users who sent us a friend request. The results of this experiment are shown
in Figure 44 (the sub-figure 44(a) and 44(b) represent the number of visitors and number
of friend requests sent to the attack profiles).
The number of users who were curious about our visit, and visited us back was consistent
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with the results of the experiments we conducted on other social networks (i.e., between 0.25
and 1.2% per month). However, only a few users later sent a friend request or a message.
The demographic breakdown for Friendster is presented in Figure 8.3.3. The statis-
tical distributions are similar to the ones obtained in the Facebook experiment, showing
the di"erence in terms of characteristics between friend-oriented and dating-oriented social
networks.
8.4 Discussion and Lessons Learned
In this section, based on the results of the empirical experiments, we distill some insights
about the way RSE attacks work in social networks. We can summarize our findings in two
main points: The importance of having the right profile, and the importance of providing
a pretext to the victims.
The first straightforward factor we were able to measure is the impact of the profile
characteristics on the overall e"ectiveness of an attack. The experiments confirm the folk
wisdom that using an attractive female photograph is a good choice to attract victims.
The success rate of the most successful female profile, in terms of both friend requests and
number of received messages, is between 2 and 40 times higher than the worse performing
profiles (i.e., the male profile and the profile without a photograph).
Note that if the objective of the attack is not simply to reach the highest number of
users, but to target a specific person or group the success rate of the attack can be improved
by carefully tuning the profile characteristics. For example, our experiments show that age
and location information are decisive in dating sites, while this information is not as critical
in more general, friend-oriented, social networks. Also, the results suggest that gender
information is always very important. Hence, a successful reverse social engineering attack
should use the opposite sex of the victims in the decoy profile.
The experiments show that the impact of the profile picture is quite uniform in di"erent
social networks. For example, we observe that young users are generally more intrigued
by attractive photographs, while decoy profiles (e.g., Profile 5) that do not contain the
photograph of a real person tend to attract more senior users.
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Obviously, even though having a catchy, interesting profile is important, our research
shows that there is a second, even more important factor that contributes to the success
of the attack: the pretext. Our experiments indicate that users need an incentive and
a good reason to engage in interaction with a person that they do not know. In other
words, users need a good excuse to “break the ice” and motivate the first approach. The
di"erences between the success rates of the attacks on Facebook and Friendster suggest that
an incentive or a pretext is critical for reverse social engineering attacks to work in practice.
The analysis of the messages received on Facebook support the hypothesis that a rec-
ommendation system gives a reason to users to initiate contact. That is, a number of users
referenced the Facebook recommendation as a motivation for their friend request. In con-
trast, on Friendster, even though the percentage of users that browsed our decoy profiles
was consistent with the other social network experiments, very few people moved to the
next step and sent a contact message. The reason is, in our opinion, that the visitor tracking
attack failed to provide a good pretext to the victims.
Note that the demographic experiment on Badoo was also very e"ective. The reason for
this success is that Badoo greatly relies on the demographic search functionality to allow
users to find possible contacts. In the case of a dating site, the pretext for establishing
contact was the fact itself of living in a close location, or being in the same age group of
the victim.
Our experiments demonstrate that reverse social engineering attacks on social networks
are feasible if they are properly designed and executed. However, contrary to the common
folk wisdom, only having an account with an attractive photograph may not be enough
to recruit a high number of unsuspecting victims. Rather, the attacker needs to combine
an attractive profile with a pretext and incentive for the victim to establish contact. Rec-
ommendation systems such as Facebook’s friend suggestions are e"ective tools for creating
such an incentive. Also, we see that profile attributes such as location and age may be the
required incentives on dating networks such as Badoo.
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8.5 RSE Countermeasures in OSN
Clearly, features that allow social network users to easily make new acquaintances are useful
in practice. However, our chapter demonstrates that such systems may also be abused to
trick users on behalf of attackers. In this section, we list three countermeasures that would
increase the di!culty of launching RSE attacks in online social networks.
First, while friend recommendation features are useful, our experiments show that they
may pose a risk to users if the attackers are able to somehow influence the recommendation
system. Hence, it is important for social network providers to show a potential connection
between two users only if there is a strong connection between them. For example, in the
case of Facebook, as our experiments show, a simple e-mail lookup does not necessarily
indicate that the users know each other. Thus, one could check other information, such as
the fact that the users already have some friends in common.
Second, we believe that it is important to closely monitor friendships that have been
established in social networks. Benign user accounts will typically send and receive friend
requests in both directions. That is, a user may be contacted by people she knows, but she
will also actively search and add friends on the network. However, in contrast, a honeypot
RSE account (as we describe in this chapter) only receives friend requests from other users.
Thus, it may be possible to identify such accounts automatically.
Third, we believe that CAPTCHA usage also needs to be extended to incoming friend
requests. Today, because of the active threats of spamming and social engineering, social
network providers may display CAPTCHAs when friend requests are sent to other users.
However, no such precautions are taken for messages and friend requests that are received.
By requiring users to solve a CAPTCHA challenge before being able to accept suspicious
incoming friend requests, we believe that RSE attacks would become more di!cult. While
CAPTCHAs are not the silver bullet in preventing and stopping malicious activity on social
networks (e.g., as show in [13,23]), they do raise the di!culty bar for the attackers.
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8.6 Related Work
Social engineering attacks are well-known in practice as well as in literature (e.g., [16,46,75,
93,100]). Social engineering targets human weaknesses instead of vulnerabilities in technical
systems. Automated Social Engineering (ASE) is the process of automatically executing
social engineering attacks. For example, spamming and phishing can be seen as a very
simple form of social engineering (i.e., making users click on links).
A general problem on social networks is that it is di!cult for users to judge if a friend
request is trustworthy or not. Thus, users are often quick in accepting invitations from
people they do not know. For example, an experiment conducted by Sophos in 2007 showed
that 41% of Facebook users acknowledged a friend request from a random person [13]. More
cautious users can be tricked by requests from adversaries that impersonate friends [23].
Unfortunately, once a connection is established, the attacker typically has full access to
all information on the victim’s profile. Moreover, users who receive messages from alleged
friends are much more likely to act upon such message, for example, by clicking on links. A
similar result was reported by Jagatic et al. [50]. The authors found that phishing attempts
are more likely to succeed if the attacker uses stolen information from victims’ friends in
social networks to craft their phishing e-mails.
In contrast to active social engineering that requires the attacker to establish contact
with the victim, in a reverse social engineering attack, it is the victim that contacts the
attacker. We are not aware of any previous reports or studies on reverse social engineering
attacks in online social networks. The results of this chapter demonstrate that automated
reverse social engineering is a realistic threat, and that it is feasible in practice.
The most well-known attack to compromise the trust relationship in a social network
that employs a reputation system is the sybil attack [33]. In this attack, the attacker
creates multiple fake identities and uses them to gain a disproportionately large influence
on the reputation system. Note that the findings in this chapter have implications for
research that aims to defend social networks against sybil attacks (e.g., SybilGuard [106],
SybilLimit [107]). SybilGuard and SybilLimit assume that real-world social networks are
fast mixing [39] and this insight is used to distinguish the sybil nodes from normal nodes.
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Fast mixing means that subsets of honest nodes have good connectivity to the rest of the
social network. Both SybilGuard and SybilLimit are good solutions for detecting Sybil
nodes. However, the attacks we present in this chapter result in legitimate friendship
connections and, therefore, would not be detected by current sybil-detection approaches.
8.7 Conclusion
Hundreds of millions of users are registered to social networking sites and regularly use
them features to stay in touch with friends, communicate, do online commerce, and share
multimedia artifacts with other users.
To be able to make suggestions and to promote friendships, social networking sites
often mine the data that has been collected about the registered users. For example, the
fact that a user looks up an e-mail address might be assumed to indicate that the user
knows the person who owns that e-mail account. Unfortunately, such assumptions can also
be abused by attackers to influence recommendations, or to increase the chance that the
victim’s interest is intrigued by a fake honey-account.
Although social engineering attacks in social networks have been well-studied to date,
reverse social engineering (RSE) attacks have not received any attention.
This chapter presents the first user study on how attackers can abuse some of the features
provided by online social networks with the aim of launching automated reverse social
engineering attacks. We present and study the e"ectiveness and feasibility of three novel
attacks: Recommendation-based, visitor tracking-based, and demographic-based reverse
social engineering.
Our results show that RSE attacks are a feasible threat in real-life, and that attackers
may be able to attract a large numbers of legitimate users without actively sending any
friend request. The experiments we have conducted demonstrate that suggestions and
friend-finding features (e.g., demographic-based searches) made by social networking sites
may provide an incentive for the victims to contact a user if the right setting is created
(e.g., an attractive photograph, an attack profile with similar interests, etc.).
We hope that this chapter will raise awareness about the real-world threat of reverse
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Figure 41: Demographic breakdown by Relationship Status, Interested In, and Age for

























































(b) Messages sent to each profile

















































































































































(b) Friend requests sent to each profile










































































In this dissertation I have demonstrated viable approaches for preventing abuse of online
communities. More specifically, I have investigated preventing against two attacks which
are linked by their opposing views on low-quality information – namely, DoI attacks in
which users perceive low-quality information as bad, and information leakage attacks in
which users perceive low-quality information released to attackers as good.
Part I: Protection against denial of information (DoI) attacks
Low-quality information from an information consumer’s standpoint
Due to the financial incentives associated with DoI attacks, adversarial adaption is an
important aspect of protecting against them. We analyze phishing messages over 15 months
and identify both flash and non-flash attacks based on content similarity. By looking at
the construction techniques used in messages, we identified: transitory features that are
associated with a few clusters and are short lived; and pervasive features that are associated
with a large number of clusters and have a long life span. We find that most of the
strong indicators of phishing messages turned out to be transitory. We use this to insight
to identify the need for measuring classification performance with some of the strongest
features removed, for any solution we propose.
To protect users from DoI attacks, we explore the e"ectiveness and long-term suitability
of profile classification using only static content, with the aim of precluding spam content
from online communities. Our results show that such a technique is definitely feasible
with a standard C4.5 decision tree performs the best with an AUC of 0.99 and 0.06%
misclassifications. Although the performance does decrease noticeably with the removal
of the strongest features, we believe that this method is still capable of being deployed to
automatically detect most spam profiles with a high confidence and mark others as gray
profiles depending on the confidence of the classifier.
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We also investigate protecting users against DoI attacks when content-rich profiles or
content-rich messages are not available for classification (such as in the case of Twitter
and classifying Tweets). We use “meta-model” classification which involves first modeling
the short tweet-text (of 140 characters or less) with a meta-model of webpages linked from
the tweet. The combined model increases performance in classifying tweets that belong
to trends. C4.5 decision trees achieve the highest F1-measure on both the classification
of tweet text and associated webpage content, resulting in an F1-measure of 0.79 and 0.9
respectively. Combining the results using an ‘OR’ operator provides the best results. We
find that fetching associated content improves our classifiers F1-measure by over 13.7%.
Part II: Protecting against information leakage attacks
Low-quality information from a private information producer’s standpoint
We approach the problem of protect users against information leakage attacks by using
information unification to bring together profiles associated with users across social network
sites, followed by modeling the amount of information leaked. After introducing information
cloaking, we quantify the reduction in users’ susceptibility towards information leakage
attacks.
We introduce a technique to unify a person’s profile across online communities utilizing
pseudonyms. We find that over 40% of a person’s online identity can be reconstructed by
using a single pseudonym, and by using the person’s name the attacker can reconstruct 10%
to 35% of a person’s online identity.
To quantify significant threat of information leakage, we introduce models to measure
the amount of public information released across unified user’s profiles. We find, based on
over 8,200 user’s online identities, that the number of users susceptible to two real-world
attacks increases approximately nine times when looking at users’ unified social profile
in comparison to users’ individual social profile. We propose four measures to quantify
information revealed by a user’s unified social profile. The first measure quantifies the
amount of information revealed by the unified social profile; the second, quantifies the
amount of information revealed and consistent in a unified social profile using Entropy from
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Information Theory; the third, quantifies the amount of information revealed and consistent
in a unified social profile using Guessing Entropy; and the last, quantifies the amount of
consistent information revealed in a unified social profile. We use these measures to build a
framework for detecting the susceptibility of a user towards an information attack, such as a
personal identification attack or a password recovery attack. Using the same dataset of 8,200
user’s online identities, we find that the number of users susceptible to attacks increases
approximately nine times when looking at a user’s combined social footprint (from 2% to
18%). We then use information cloaking to reduce the usefulness of information publicly
released by reducing its granularity. For example, instead of publicly releasing an age of 25,
a social network might indicate that the user is between the ages of 20-25.
Lastly, we demonstrate social engineering attacks against online communities. Our
results demonstrate that reverse social engineering attacks are feasible and attackers can
friend a large number of users without actively sending friend requests. We show that
suggestions and friend-finding features (e.g., demographic-based searches) made by social
networking sites may provide an incentive for the victims to contact a user if the right
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